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Because the federal securities laws are, at heart, about
disclosure, the question of whether and when there is a duty to
disclose is often the central question in any given case. Certainly, the
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) has broad powers to compel
disclosures by issuers and certain others and has crafted a mandatory
disclosure regime that creates many explicit duties. For a variety of
reasons, however, this explicit regime falls short of a comprehensive
answer to the duty question. For some sixty years now, the hardest
duty questions have been addressed under the rubric of fraud, mainly
under Rule 10b-5, the principal antifraud provision of the securities
laws.'
Over those years, some questions have been settled. For
example, a person who chooses to speak in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence investors assumes the duty to speak
truthfully. 2 The difficult duty questions arise mainly when there is
silence about some material fact, either because the person in question
has said nothing at all or because what was said was not a clear
misrepresentation of the truth.
There is a considerable amount of confusion in the case law on
the duty question, which motivates this Article. 3 This confusion is
surprising precisely because duty is so central and because the courts
(and the SEC) have had so long to work on it. The story is one of
twists and turns. Prior to 1980, the courts and commentators were
struggling with the affirmative duty to disclose mainly by invoking
flexible, open-ended obligations. 4 This was so both in insider trading -
1. The authority for Rule 10b-5 is Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
For background on Section 10(b), see generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 237 (1988); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857-865 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
3. For a description of the confusion from the perspective of a lawyer advising a client on a
difficult disclosure judgment, see Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Constance E. Bagley, Great Expectations:
Risk Management Through Risk Disclosure, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 155, 165-180 (1994).
4. Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67
Geo. L.J. 935, 936 (1979) ("Although no case has so held, a few courts have suggested that there
is a general duty to disclose."); Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
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the area that generated the largest number of duty questions - and in
other settings, such as the issuer's duty to disclose some facts
immediately rather than wait for its next mandatory filing. This
approach shifted abruptly in Chiarella v. United States, when the
Supreme Court announced in dicta that "[w]hen an allegation of fraud
is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to
speak" and that such a duty arises only when one party has
information "that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary
or similar relation of trust and confidence between them."5 Ever since,
the lower courts have struggled to make sense of what the Court
meant. Was the Court restricting the means of duty creation only in
the insider trading area, or did it mean to cover the entire space under
the Section 10(b) tent, including issuer obligations, broker-dealer
duties, mutual fund behavior, and so on? Many have taken the Court
at its word, so that fiduciary-type duties are the only avenues along
which affirmative duties to disclose may be found. 6 The result in a
1340, 1342-44 (1966) (recommending the adoption of a "new coordinate disclosure system having
as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act" in light of the confusion created by
the disclosure laws); Donald M. Feurestein, The Corporation's Obligations of Disclosure Under
the Federal Securities Laws When It is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15 N.Y. L.F. 385, 385-86 (1969)
(discussing the complex myriad of disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and its subsequent amendments); Ted J. Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's Former
Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 95, 95 (1978) (discussing the difficulty of satisfying the
"materiality standard" of disclosure); Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal Corporation Law": An
Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146, 1148-49 (1965) ("Because disclosure is designed to provide
investors with the data necessary to make informed judgments, the information required [to be
disclosed] may encompass all aspects of corporate life, and consequently all aspects of corporate
life may be affected."); Joseph H. Flom & Peter Atkins, The Expanding Scope of SEC Disclosure
Laws, 52 Harv. Bus. Rev. 109, 112 (1974) (surveying the unpredictability of liability due to non-
disclosure under the "continuity flow of information approach."); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The
Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 Fordham L. Rev.
565, 587 (1972) (advocating the new disclosure requirements that "should remain flexible" and be
reviewed periodically by the SEC "so that disclosure relates to societal needs."); Alan L.
Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation Have an
Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 Denv. L.J. 369, 390 (1972) (commenting that despite
numerous cases that expound on the subject, "the questioning whether a corporation has an
affirmative duty to disclose," has not been answered.').
5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
6. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1418 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting nondisclosure claim by
debenture holders on the grounds that, under Chiarella, if there is no fiduciary-type duty to
disclose under state law, there can be no liability for nondisclosure under Section 10(b)); Nelson
v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. CV203-131, 2004 WL 1592617, at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 12, 2004)
(describing Chiarella's directive as requiring a relationship of "trust and confidence" before a
duty to disclose can be found); Drnek v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. CIV 01-242-TUC-
WDB, 2004 WL 1098919, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2004) (explaining that the flexible duty to
disclose from White v. Abrams survives only to the extent the relationship in question is of the
type described in Chiarella); see also Gregory S. Porter, What did You Know and When did You
Know it?: Public Company Disclosure and the Mythical Duties to Correct and Update, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2203-2204 (2000) (discussing how the Court's opinion in Chiarella is
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number of lower court decisions has been a cutback on duty in cases
that extend well outside the insider trading context. Other courts
have taken different approaches. 7 The confusion has turned to a
hopeless clutter, which we try to help clean up.
To do so, we first have to understand why the law shifted away
from the broad, flexible duties that existed both at common law and in
the first generations of federal securities cases. One possible answer -
connecting our project to others in this Symposium - is that, as in so
many other doctrinal moves during the same time period, the law
showed an increasing judicial hostility to expansive interpretations of
the federal securities laws, especially in the context of private
securities litigation and fraud-on-the-market lawsuits. There is
probably some truth to this. But we should be careful. After all, the
affirmative duty to disclose has been an extraordinarily hard subject
in contracts and torts for centuries. Discussions of the question of
when silence amounts to an affirmative misrepresentation are
contained in the Talmud, as well as the writings of Cicero, Pothier,
and Aquinas.8 Modern legal academia has produced a number of
classic articles on the affirmative disclosure question, without
reaching any clear consensus.9 Perhaps the courts' confusion is simply
a product of the legitimate difficulty of the questions.
seen as setting the parameters for the lower courts as to what the possible sources of the
affirmative duty to disclose might be - that is, fiduciary or fiduciary-type relationships); Robert
A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. Rev. 691, 721 (1997) (explaining, in the
context of third party suits for misrepresentations, that the Supreme Court has been viewed as
allowing only one exception to the general rule that omissions are not actionable- the fiduciary
duty one).
7. One of the more expansive readings of the duty analysis came recently in In re Initial
Public Offering Securities Litigation where Judge Scheindlin appeared to see Chiarella's
fiduciary-based duty as but one possible source of the duty to disclose. 241 F. Supp. 2d. 281, 380-
84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In a case where the Underwriters allegedly failed to disclose certain
compensation that they were receiving in the offering context, the court found that a duty to
disclose existed because (a) there was a presumption of honest behavior and the failure to
disclose all forms of compensation was manipulative; (b) the SEC and NASD rules mandated
disclosure of this compensation; and (c) because the Underwriters were in effect engaging in
insider trading of the type prohibited by Chiarella's disclose or abstain rule. Id.
8. For treatments of the historical evolution of the affirmative duty to disclose at common
law, see, for example, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Law and
the Sin of Omission (2004) (unpublished draft) (an empirical study of the evolution of the duty to
disclose under the common law); Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring a Historical
Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 COM. L. J. 168, 170-76 (1999)
(describing the historical evolution of the duty to disclose, with reference to the classic texts on
the subject); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents
of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1317 (1998) (similar).
9. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1,
2-5 (1936); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 26-27 (1978); Kim Lane Scheppele, 'It's Just Not Right: The Ethics of Insider
1642 [Vol. 57:5:1639
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Our goal here is not to propose a grand normative theory of
how to solve these confusions and contradictions. In other words, we
do not take the standard law review route of seeking to articulate a
general theory of how judges should decide disclosure questions so as
to maximize efficiency, fairness, or some other criteria. Instead, this
Article is an exercise in judicial process. We are most interested in
identifying the inconsistencies in the cases, which-after Part I's
introduction of what we consider some useful typology-we do in Part
II. Part of the effort, therefore, is just descriptive, because we think
there is a value in demonstrating the degree of confusion. But we do
have a normative goal, which is pursued in Part III. Our sense is that
the confusion has grown to a point where courts today confronting a
duty issue have a difficult time even seeing how the issue fits into the
10b-5 case law, or what precedent and authority might be misleading
rather than helpful. We hope to reorient legal analysis so that some of
the clutter disappears and the real choices at least appear more
clearly.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
A. Materiality versus Duty
Two central and required elements in any securities fraud case
are materiality and duty. 10 In court opinions on the fraud question, it
is often hard to determine whether the judge is basing her decision on
materiality or duty. 11 We suspect that that is because the distinction
between the two elements is fuzzy at the margins. Conceptually
though, in order to provide a meaningful discussion about the duty
Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider
Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982); Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV.
322 (1979) (examining the extent to which silence should be prohibited in securities trading);
Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20
(1994); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical
Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 783, 796 (1992).
10. For a detailed treatment of the materiality concept, its relationship to duty, and its
central role in the securities antifraud jurisprudence, see JAMES COX ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION ch. 11 (4th ed. 2004).
11. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 233 n.10 (1998) (noting that, in determining
whether the disclosure of preliminary merger talks was required, lower courts often did not
make clear whether their decisions were based on materiality or duty determinations); see also
Steven A. Fishman, Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5 in Face-to-Face Transactions, 12 J. CORP.
L. 252, 281-83 (1987) (discussing a number of cases that find Section 10(b) liability but do not
explain the source of the duty to disclose).
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question, we have to separate it carefully from the materiality
question. Materiality refers to the matter of whether a piece of
information would likely be important to the reasonable investor.1 2
Duty, by contrast, refers to whether there is an obligation to disclose a
certain category of information. 13 As the courts state repeatedly, the
former is usually a factual question and the latter a question of law.
There are many facts (such as preliminary merger negotiations) that
can fall within the definition of materiality yet do not have to be
disclosed.
As a practical matter, however, the concepts are not so easily
separated. One reason is that in deciding whether a certain duty to
disclose is broad enough to include a particular type of information,
the court often has to consider how and why the information at issue
would have been important to investors. 14 This is because the
underlying rationale for the construction of the disclosure duties (by
Congress, the SEC, or the courts) is that this type of information is
likely to be important to investors. For example, take the duty to
update, which at least some courts have articulated as being a
function of investor expectations-that is, one has a duty to update if
one's prior statement implicitly suggested a promise to update.' 5 If
the information at issue is extremely important-for example,
involving a major change in a company's fortunes, such as a
merger-then courts seem comfortable finding a duty to update the
initial announcement. 16  Put differently, the duty analysis gets
wrapped up in an evaluation of heightened materiality. But this
intersectional area aside, it is important to keep the two concepts
separate. This is because of two foundation stones in the securities
12. COX ET AL, supra note 10, § 10.4
13. Id.
14. For example, in its discussion of the duty question, one court recently said: "In the end,
the central question [on whether there exists a duty] remains whether disclosure of the
information would have had a significant effect on the decisions of a reasonable shareholder."
Baron v. Smith, 285 F. Supp. 2d. 96, 103 (D. Mass. 2003). Whether the information has an effect
on the decision of the reasonable shareholder, of course, is a rough articulation of the materiality
standard. Or, more explicitly, as explained by the Court in Shaw, the "task of deciding whether
particular information is subject to mandatory disclosure is not easily separable from normative
judgments about the kinds of information that the securities laws should require to be disclosed,
which depend, in essence, on conceptions of materiality." Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d
1194, 1202-1203 (D. Mass. 1996).
15. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir. 1997).
16. Id. One sees similar reasoning in the test for intra-quarterly disclosure articulated in
Shaw, which is that interim information as to a quarter in progress has to be disclosed if it
amounts to an "extreme departure" from expectations. Shaw, 82 F.3d. at 1210. In both these
cases we see how the courts construct duties to disclose as a function of some heightened
materiality; the underlying rationale being that while investors do not expect disclosure of all
routine material information, they expect to be told when there are major changes.
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disclosure architecture. First, not all material information has to be
disclosed. 17 Second, immaterial information is often required to be
disclosed (although not under Rule 10b-5).18 Any suggestion that
materiality and duty are the same would disturb these foundational
elements.
B. Tort Thinking versus Property Thinking
The duty to disclose has two distinct, if overlapping,
dimensions. In elaborating these distinctions, we try to distinguish
between contexts (including both speech and acts) that mislead by
implication and those that do not.19 The first-which we refer to as
the "tort" dimension-is based on the intuition that certain categories
of nondisclosure are sometimes actually misleading. That is to say,
when there is (or has been) a pattern of communication between the
source and one or more investors, reasonable expectations may evolve
so that an omission of a certain fact does or does not deceive. Usually
discussed under the rubric of "materiality," as noted above, we find an
almost full set of rules for explicit categories of conversation that do
and do not deceive, rules that specify what reasonable persons expect
from conversations in the market.
The other dimension can be described as a "property" construct.
Harking back to the earliest formulations of the affirmative duty to
disclose, many expressions of the duty are designed to create property-
like entitlements to information on the part of the counter-party to the
transaction or to a larger class of investors. Whether based on
concerns of fairness or efficiency, the effort here is to create
expectations as a matter of law rather than protect pre-existing ones.
To be sure, the distinction is not always a clear one, but many cases
illustrate the separation fairly well. Take insider trading as an
example. The insider's conduct in directing trades is done
anonymously and without any real communicative content. Hence,
imposing a duty to disclose is simply a mechanism for depriving the
17. E.g., Baron, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 103; see supra note 14.
18. Although the rationale for the construction of the various disclosure obligations of
companies - such as their periodic filing obligations in Forms 10-Q and 10-K - is that the
information is likely to be important to investors, not every piece of information required is going
to be important in every instance.
19. The distinction between speech and implication is one that we borrow from Grice's
classic work. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS ch. 2 (1989). To our knowledge, even
though Grice's work is recognized as classic and foundational in the study of language and
meaning more generally, it has received but limited application in law schools. For an
application of Grice's work to the question of fraud based on nondisclosure or silence, see Peter
Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12 n.34, 50-57 (1995).
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insider of the profits and giving them to some other group. This is
plainly property-type thinking.
We suspect that many modern judges are uncomfortable with
property-based duties to disclose under Rule 10b-5, and most of the
muddles in the law are the product of this discomfort. At base, the
cause of the discomfort is the difficulty of determining optimal
disclosure rules. The familiar trade-offs between promoting fairness
and efficiency-which may call for aggressive information sharing-
and rewarding information discovery and protecting legitimate needs
for secrecy are difficult to make. This, we believe, has led many courts
to doubt their own institutional competency and to look for reasons to
shift responsibility elsewhere. Two excuses are particularly
appealing. One, with a sound statutory basis, is that Congress has
given to the SEC the primary responsibility for creating the property-
like entitlements, at least as to issuer disclosure. If the SEC has not
created a duty, why should the courts? The other is federalism.
Property-type reasoning takes the court closer and closer to the
concerns historically relegated to the states, so that it might also be
convenient to use federalism as an excuse for being conservative in
creating disclosure duties.
II. SOME MUDDLED DUTY QUESTIONS UNDER RULE 1OB-5
With this background, we turn to the case law. Our effort for
now is simply to identify some major areas in which there is
inconsistency on the basic duty question, either as between different
cases or in the internal justification for a particular line of authority.
A. Duties out of SEC Line-Item Disclosure Requirements
One of the main places where the duty law is confused arises
from explicit SEC disclosure requirements. Does failure to disclose
information called for in a line-item requirement operate as a breach
of duty actionable under Rule 10b-5?
Courts display the greatest comfort giving an affirmative
answer in the public offering context. Those who purchase in the
actual offering itself can sue directly under Section 11 of the Securities
Act. 20 But also there may be investors who purchased securities other
than those issued pursuant to the registration statement (such as
when the registered offering was for a class other than the common
20. Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (i1th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 57:5:16391646
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stock traded in the open markets).21 May these traders sue under
Section 10(b) for omissions in the offering documents? At least some
courts answer this question in the affirmative. 22 The analysis used
explicitly is the tort-type analysis described above--that there is a
presumption that reasonable investors rely on the accuracy and
completeness of the formal disclosure documents connected with
public offerings, such that failures to comply can be assumed to
mislead.23
The confusion begins when we turn to contexts not involving a
public offering. Public companies are required to make disclosures
under a variety of SEC rules including those governing proxy
statements, quarterly reports, and annual reports. Naturally, the
question here is whether the failure to satisfy these rules can give rise
to a private action under Section 10(b). The courts could simply follow
the tort-type analysis described above and determine whether
investors expect these disclosure requirements to be satisfied and,
therefore, are misled when they are not fulfilled. This is the approach
21. Steve Choi reports that even a large portion of IPO cases involve Section 10(b) claims.
Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the PSLRA? (Working Paper Jan. 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=558285.
22. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp. 82 F.3d. 1194, 1221 (1st Cir. 1996); In re Initial
Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. 241 F. Supp. 2d. 281, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The analyses in these cases
that involve omissions of statements (that is, duty questions), build upon the analysis in classic
Second Circuit cases such as Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951) (Frank, J.). See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222 (citing In re Ames Dept. Stores Stock Litig., 991
F.2d 953, 963 (2d. Cir. 1993) and invoking Judge Frank and his analysis in Fischman). Judge
Frank, a former SEC Chairman, explained in Fischman that investors other than those
specifically targeted in an offering could be misled by falsities in the registration statement for
that offering. 188 F.2d at 786-87.
There are other courts, however, that have shown a reluctance to allow Section 10(b)
plaintiffs to piggyback on violations under Section 11, at least when the Section 11 violations
have been premised on failures to comply with the requirements of Item 303. For example, in
Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit was
willing to recognize that allegations of violations of SK-303 were sufficient to satisfy a Section 11
claim. But, the court made clear their reasoning did not extend to Rule 10b-5 claims. Id. (citing
In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993)). Note, however, that the court in
Steckman is not clear on whether it is talking about the duty question (which should presumably
be the same for Section 11 and Section 10(b) claims) or the matter of a violation under those
statutes generally (which would be different for the two statutes because Section 10(b) has
additional requirements such as scienter). 143 F.3d at 1293.
23. Both Shaw and In re Public Offering explicitly invoke the reliance of investors on the
accuracy and completeness of disclosures made in the offering/registration in finding duties to
disclose. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222 n.37; In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig, 241 F. Supp. 2d at
380-382. Interestingly though, both cases also demonstrate the judges' discomfort with using the
tort-type analysis, because they also invoke property-type thinking in drawing analogies to the
insider trading context (and Chiarella and Dirks) suggesting that there would be a finding of
duty under that analytical method as well. The implications of which method is used, however,
as we explain, are significant.
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courts take when affirmative misrepresentations are alleged in 10-K's
and 10-Q's.
But as noted above, this is not the route that many courts have
taken when there is nondisclosure. A number of courts have held that
line-item do not give rise to fraud-based duties. 24 They do not,
however, tend to make their positions on this matter clear. For
purposes of the discussion that follows, we will take the line-item
disclosure requirement that has been the subject of almost all of the
litigation on this matter, Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which covers the
obligation to disclose "known trends . . . and uncertainties" in 10-K's
and 10-Q's. 25 Putting aside the opinions that do not make clear their
rationale for refusing to recognize a duty arising out of a failure to
comply with this rule (other than to say that other courts have been
reluctant to find such a duty), we will focus on the judicial opinions
that do attempt a meaningful explanation. Working through the
variety of explanations that courts have used for denying that Item
303 can be the basis for a duty to disclose, we will demonstrate the
discomfort that courts have with this question.
The first explanation is based on analogy. In In re Pacific
Gateway,26 for example, the court looked to cases holding that stock
exchange disclosure requirements did not provide a basis for Section
10(b) claims to conclude that neither should SEC rules such as Item
303. Tapping into what we suspect are concerns about excessive
24. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott Labs., 140 F. Supp. 2d 894, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (explaining
that SEC disclosure rules, while perhaps informative, do not produce a duty to disclose for
purposes of Section 10(b)).
25. See, e.g., In re Quintel Entm't Inc. Sec. Litig., 72 F. Supp. 2d. 283, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(refusing to hold that a failure to satisfy Item 303 can be the basis of a Section 10(b) claim
because of the lack of authority to support that position); Newby v. Lay (In re Enron Corp. Sec.
Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 632 n.63 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that a
violation of Item 303 does not establish a duty to disclose that may give rise to liability under
Section 10(b)); Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (D.R.I. 2002)
(determining that even if the plaintiffs are able to prove that defendants violated Item 303's
disclosure requirements, a violation of those requirements does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that such disclosure would have been required under Rule 10b-5). For earlier cases
expressing skepticism regarding whether there can be a private right of action under Section
10(b) that draws the duty violation out of Item 303, see In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F.
Supp. 1202, 1209 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that "it is far from certain that the requirement
that there be a duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 may be satisfied by importing the disclosure
duties from S-K 303," but withholding decision on the relationship between S-K 303 and 10b-5
actions because of finding that there was no duty to disclose under S-K 303); Alfus v. Pyramid
Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 607-08 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[D]emonstration of a violation of the
disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such
disclosure would be required under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be separately
shown.").
26. In re Pacific Gateway Exchange, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C-00-1211 PJH, 2002 WL 851066,
at *13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2002).
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private litigation, cases such as this explain that creating private
rights of action is a serious matter and that SEC rules, like exchange
listing standards, 27 do not give rise to them automatically. 28 The
problem with this analysis is twofold. First, it errs in asking whether
there is a private right of action under the SEC rule. That is beside
the point. The statute in question is Section 10(b), and the question of
whether there is a private right of action was decided in the
affirmative years ago. The only question here is the propensity of
nondisclosure in a filing to deceive and hence be fraudulent. In any
event, the analogy to exchange rules is a false one. Given that
primary authority in this area was delegated to the SEC, the SEC
rules should be more likely than the stock exchange rules to produce a
duty violation.29
A different route that the district and circuit courts in In re
Verifone used is to look to the nature of the Item 303 disclosure
requirement. 30  It requires the disclosure of certain "trends and
27. See, e.g., Freedman v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 377, 387 n.6 (D. Or. 1996)
(citing Chiarella for the proposition that there are two bases for the duty to disclose: (1) the
presence of a fiduciary-type duty; and (2) unfairness). The second basis seems extremely broad
and we are not aware of any other court that has read this second basis into Chiarella (Plus,
given that Justice Powell was supposedly trying to cabin the reach of Section 10(b), it seems
unlikely that he would have created such a broad duty). The Freedman court then, in another
bizarre turn, also cites to the long-forgotten "flexible duty" as a possible basis for the duty under
Section 10(b). Id. In the end, the court rejects the argument that the exchange rules or Item 303
can be the basis for a duty analysis under Section 10(b). Id. at 390. Although, in yet another
bizarre analytical move, the court says that those violations could be the basis for a
determination of scienter. Id..
28. The source of this analogous treatment appears to be In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 784 F.
Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd 11 F.3d. 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993), where the argument was in
fact somewhat more subtle. In the VeriFone cases, as we read them, the basis for rejecting the
duty claim based on Item 303 was the rationale that since the information at issue was arguably
forward looking, the fact that disclosure of forward looking information was optional under Rule
175, Instruction 7, obviated any possible duty to disclose. Id. The reason that the exchange
rules came up at all in the VeriFone cases was that they were being alleged as an independent
source of a possible duty to disclose. Id. at 868. That said, at least one other court has read
VeriFone as standing for the proposition that there is no duty to disclose that arises out of SEC
disclosure rule violations. See Kriendler v. Chemical Waste Mgmt, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1140, 1151,
1157 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing VeriFone, 11 F.3d 865, for the proposition that SEC Regulation SK-
303, which requires companies to report certain events, uncertainties and trends, does not
provide a private right of action).
29. The exchange rules cases are themselves interesting, although one can understand the
reluctance of courts to recognize their broad disclosure standards as giving rise to fraud liability.
Using tort-based reasoning, one could readily say that because the exchanges have not
historically enforced their disclosure standards, reasonable investors in fact have no expectation
that they actually generate the disclosure that their text demands.
30. See supra note 28 (discussing the VeriFone cases). The "these are forecasts" logic of the
VeriFone cases is picked up in other cases. See, e.g., In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Sofamor
Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that information issued by
defendant regarding certain merchandising practices was "forward looking information" that
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uncertainties." Trends and uncertainties, these courts explain, are, in
effect, forecasts, and the SEC has, in other places, said that the
disclosure of forecasts or forward-looking statements is voluntary. 31
This argument is problematic in light of the fact that the SEC
specifically requires "trends and uncertainties" to be disclosed (and
that specific requirement should, presumably, trump the more general
exception). 32 But putting the matter of statutory construction aside,
there is the threshold question of whether there is some way in which
trends and uncertainties can be disclosed without violating the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements. If so, then one would think
that the courts would utilize that. And, indeed, there is a method for
such disclosure. Let us say that there is some reason why Item 303
applies to the data as to the first eight weeks of a quarter in progress
(for example, there is a public offering that is done at that point, as in
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp33). Data for the first eight weeks of
the thirteen week quarter is presumably enough to produce something
of a trend. A company does not have to make a forecast to say
something like "our earnings for the first eight weeks of the quarter
are 50 percent less than those for what they were for the comparable
quarter last year." Or it could say: "Our preliminary results for the
quarter in progress have been disappointing. But we don't know what
the full quarter results will reveal." Those are disclosures of trends
and uncertainties, but not forecasts. 34
There is also a third route. Recently, a number of courts have
invoked the explanation set forth in the Third Circuit's opinion in
Oran v. Stafford.35 Here, the explanation rests on problems with Item
does not give rise to a duty to disclose); Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701, 708 n.3 (8th Cir.
2002) (A Section 11 case, where the court's primary argument for rejecting plaintiffs' claim is
that the information as to a change in the contract position of one customer (albeit, the largest
one, id. at 713 (Bye, J., dissenting)) was not enough to produce a "trend.").
31. Supra note 28 (discussing the VeriFone cases' invocation of Instruction 7 of Rule 175).
32. One of the canons of statutory interpretation is that when there is a more specific
statutory provision that is inconsistent with a more general one, the former is interpreted as an
exception to the latter. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 274-75 (2000).
33. 82 F.3d 1194, 1200-1201 (1st Cir. 1996).
34. Some courts have recognized this point. In re Retek, Inc. Sec., No. Civ. 02-4209, 2004
WL 741571, at *8 n.12 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2004) (making this point explicitly); see also Shaw, 82
F.3d 1194, 1205-06 (allowing an Item 303 claim).
35. See, e.g., Newby v. Lay (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 258 F.
Supp. 2d 576, 632 n.63 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Oran for the proposition that Item 303 does not
produce a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b)); Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Co.,
217 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D.R.I. 2002) (citing Oran for the proposition that a violation of Item
303, while probative, is not enough to produce a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b)); In
re Pacific Gateway Exchange, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C-00-1211 PJH, 2002 WL 851066, at *13 n.10
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303's materiality standard. The Oran court explained that because
the rule (Item 303) has its own materiality standard that is different
from that articulated by the Supreme Court for securities fraud
determinations generally, noncompliance with the rule cannot
automatically produce a violation of Section 10(b). 36 That much of the
analysis makes a degree of sense. If the materiality analysis for the
rule is different (lower) from that for Section 10(b), of course, one has
to do an additional materiality analysis to determine whether the
statute was violated. But the next step of the Oran court is
problematic. That is the suggestion that there is no duty to disclose
under the rule because the materiality standard of the rule differs
from that of the statute. 37 This is an illustration of courts confusing
duty and materiality. The duty question is simply whether violations
of this category of disclosure requirements have the potential to
mislead. If so, then one goes to the question of whether the particular
violation was material, so as to create liability under Section 10(b).
Surely there are some trends and uncertainties that would be of
importance to investors. For example, if the company is telling
investors that the results for its past three quarters were the best in
years, investors would probably like to know that the quarter in
progress is looking to be the worst in the company's history.
If the bases for finding that line items do not give rise to fraud
liability are confusing, the explanations found in the many cases that
go the other way are not much better. To fine tune the point about
judicial discomfort on this matter, consider the leading case on
disclosure duties out of Item 303 in the public offering context, Shaw
v. Digital Equipment Inc. Shaw finds that Item 303 produces a duty to
disclose that can be the basis for a Section 10(b) claim. 38 Then, it goes
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2002). (using Oran as one basis for rejecting the claim that Item 303 can
create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b)).
36. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Pac. Gateway Exch. Inc., 2002
WL 851066, at *13 n.10 (explaining that the Oran court "found Item 303 of Regulation S-K
inapplicable in a § 10(b) suit [because] the test for materiality established by the SEC in the May
1989 Release varies considerably from the general test for securities fraud materiality set out by
the Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson"); see also In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Sofamor
Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 1997) (Item 303's disclosure requirements are not
presumptively material); In re Boston Tech, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 67 (D. Mass. 1998) (the very
relevance of an Item 303 violation to a Rule 10b-5 violation is subject to dispute); In re Enron,
258 F. Supp. 2d at 632 n.63 (citing Oran for the proposition that a "violation of Item 303 does not
establish a duty to disclose that may give rise to liability under §10(b)"). For a case prior to Oran
that also used the matter of different materiality standards under Section 10(b) and Item 303 as
a basis for saying that there was no duty to disclose under Item 303, see Alfus v. Pyramid Tech.
Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
37. Oran, 226 F.3d. at 288 (suggesting that, because of Item 303's different materiality
standard, "a duty to disclose must be separately shown") (citations omitted).
38. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222.
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on gratuitously to say that it is not reaching the issue of whether there
is a private right of action under Item 303. 39 There was no need for
this, though, because once again, the plaintiffs were not claiming that
they should be able to sue under Item 303. In other words, the issue
that the court claimed that it was not reaching did not exist. The
plaintiffs' suit was under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 40 The effect of
the gratuitous disclaimer in Shaw, though, was to confuse the matter
and make the issue of whether Item 303 did produce a duty unclear. 41
Other cases that suggest that there might be a duty to disclose
stemming from Item 303, obfuscate in their own way. So, if one goes
to the cases that do suggest that Item 303 (or line-item requirements,
more broadly) can give rise to a duty to disclose-and there are a
number of these cases--many of them simply assume that a duty
exists. Cases like In re Scholastic Corp. Securities Litigation42 are in
39. Id.
40. The case also contained claims under Section 11, where the duty issues were easier. Id.
at 1204.
41. One illustration of the confusion caused by the gratuitous statement in Shaw is that one
sees later that it gets cited in the same breath as prior cases such as In re Canandaigua, where
the court explicitly declined to find a duty to disclose for Section 10(b) purposes stemming from
Item 303, even though the two cases say precisely the opposite thing on whether there is a
Section 10(b) duty under Item 303. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
n.7 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing both, In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 at n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) and Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222, for the proposition that it is not clear that there is a
private right of action under Item 303). A more concrete illustration of the problems caused by
the waffling language in Shaw is that there are still courts in the First Circuit that are unclear
on whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose under Section 10(b). In In re Boston Tech, Inc., 8
F. Supp. 2d 43, 67 (D. Mass. 1998), the district court goes so far as to cite to a district court case
in Shaw (that Shaw reversed on this precise issue) for support that there is no duty to disclose
that is created under Item 303 for purposes of a RulelOb-5 suit; see also Oran, 226 F.3d 275, 288
(also citing the district court in Shaw for support on the Item 303 duty issue).
42. 252 F.3d 63, 70-75 (2d Cir. 2001). See also In re Blockbuster Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:02-
CV.0398-M, 2004 WL 884308, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2004) (granting defendant's motion to
dismiss, with leave to amend portions of the complaint, but appearing to accept the duty to
disclose argument based on Item 303); Druskin v. Answerthing, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1319
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (same). Cf. State of N.J. v. Sprint Corp., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1135-38 (D. Kan.
2004) (appearing to accept that line-item disclosure rules, in this case, items 103, 401(e), and
10(b)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K and 9(e)(3) of Regulation 14A, can give rise to actionable duties to
disclose under Section 10(b), but providing little explanation); In re SeaChange Int'l Inc., No. Civ.
A. 02-12116-DPW, 2004 WL 240317, at *10-12 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2004) (appearing to accept that
Item 103 and Item 303 of Regulation S-K can produce duties to disclose for Section 11, but also
providing little explanation).
Perhaps best illustrating the muddled nature of the inquiry in this area is Kafenbaum v.
GTECH Holdings Co., which managed to both say that Item 303 created a duty to disclose for
purposes of Section 10(b) and then also say that it did not. 217 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-250 (D.R.I.
2002) (conflating the duty and materiality issues into the duty analysis); see also Wallace v. Sys.
& Computer Tech. Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808, at *22 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that Item 303 produces a duty to disclose, but then saying that such a duty is not
"inevitable").
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this vein: they recognize the duty creation effect of the SEC's line-item
rules, but they fail to meaningfully engage the cases that appear to
resist the duty, thereby providing little basis for other courts to
understand their reasoning.
It may be that there is something specific about Item 303 that
courts find problematic, such as its forward-looking aspect or its
heightened materiality standard, but then we would expect courts to
say that this line-item disclosure requirement is special and explain
that the duty arises readily under the other line-item requirements. 43
But, for the most part, they do not. What we see instead is that many
courts are willing to twist and turn in a variety of directions to avoid
finding a duty stemming out of SEC rules. And even when they do
find a duty, they confuse the matter. Why is there this reluctance to
allow for an affirmative duty to disclose arising out of SEC disclosure
requirements? The puzzle has at least two elements. First, there is
courts' unwillingness to draw authority from what seems to be the
obvious source of authority. After all, the SEC is the administrative
agency to whom authority for implementing the securities laws was
delegated. Moreover, virtually none of the courts, no matter how they
rule, observe that for all the straining on the nondisclosure question,
there is clarity that a misrepresentation in a line-item disclosure does
lead to 10b-5 exposure. With all that struggle and muddling, could
one possibly justify conceptually a regime in which affirmative
misstatements lead immediately to fraud liability but silence never
does?44
Perhaps courts sense that they are being asked to create new
property entitlements (where companies are forced to part with their
proprietary information). But they are not. The question of whether
companies have to part with the information was already decided by
the SEC in the affirmative. The only question before the courts with
regards to noncompliance with the SEC's line items is whether
investors were entitled to rely on their completeness (or, whether the
43. Instead, when they do make generalizations, they tend to be in the direction of saying
that SEC disclosure rules do not give rise to duty violations. See Anderson v. Abbott Labs., 140
F. Supp. 2d. 894, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
44. For example, in In re Campbell Soup Co. Securities Litigation, 145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 591
(D.N.J. 2001), a New Jersey district court acknowledged that the Third Circuit has demonstrated
a reluctance to find a duty to disclose stemming out of Item 303 for purposes of Section 10(b), but
explained that that is not important because there were explicitly misleading statements made
in the company's filings that could support the plaintiffs' claim. Similarly, in Anderson v. Abbott,
the district court explained that plaintiffs lost because (a) they did not identify explicit
statements in the company's filings and press releases that were misleading and (b) because
Item 303 and the other SEC disclosure rules, while probative, do not give rise to a duty to
disclose for purposes of Section 10(b). 140 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
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incompleteness would have been misleading). This latter analysis is
routine tort-type analysis.
B. Fiduciary Duties
Ask any law student who has just completed a basic
corporations or securities class what the primary source of the duty to
disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) is and we suspect she will
answer: "fiduciary duties."45 The reason for this likely answer is that
the only occasions on which the Supreme Court has explicitly tackled
the "when is silence fraudulent?" question has been in the insider
trading cases. And in those cases, as noted earlier, the Court
explicitly said that it was looking to fiduciary principles in finding
violations of Section 10(b). 46
Ironies abound in this determination, not the least of which is
that the Court was promoting fiduciary obligation to the forefront of
Rule 10b-5 reasoning just a few years after holding in Santa Fe
Industries v. Green-with strong reference to federalism principles-
that a breach of fiduciary duty is not, for that reason alone, a breach of
the Rule. 47 Fiduciary duties are mainly the province of state law, and
the message of Santa Fe seemed to be that the federal courts were not
going to intrude there. 48 But intrude they did. At first cut, Justice
Powell's incorporation of the common law in Chiarella looks to have
been consistent with Santa Fe's teachings in that he appeared to be
45. The common law derivation of the principles articulated by the Court in Chiarella has
been explored by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1982) (describing the
development of fiduciary principles in insider trading cases); Theresa A. Gabaldon, State
Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of Federal Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L.
155, 202-10 (1994) (describing the role of common law in filling the gaps in federal securities
regulation); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1995) (explaining the
relationship between fiduciary duty and the scope of the disclose or abstain rule).
46. For a recent discussion, see Carol Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b-5 and
the Death of Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 172-175, n.138-n.145 (2003) (describing the
emergence of the Court's use of the fiduciary principle to cabin the "disclose or abstain" principle
that had arisen out of the SEC's determination in Cady Roberts and the Second Circuit's decision
in Texas Gulf Sulphur).
47. For a discussion of this point, see Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's
Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH U. L. Q. 449 (2001).
48. For example, Theresa Gabaldon writes:
In view of Santa Fe's holding that there is no federal law of fiduciary duty, the duty to disclose
evidently is a matter of state law. This approach is more than a little unsatisfactory, given that
states typically imposed no such generalized duty of disclosure before the federal courts began to
suggest its existence.
Gabaldon, supra note 45, at 160.
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restricting the duty to disclose in insider trades to what was perhaps
the most well established basis for the duty from the common law:
that is, the presence of a fiduciary-type relationship. And, many lower
courts have read Chiarella to say precisely that duty creation in the
Section 10(b) context is restricted to those relationships that are
recognized as fiduciary or fiduciary-type at common law. 49 But, as
many commentators have pointed out, closer examination reveals the
reverse. Justice Powell's duty creation in Chiarella deviated from the
common law in two important ways: it was at once both under- and
over-inclusive. 50 First, Justice Powell extended the fiduciary principle
to a context in which the common law did not recognize it (the case of
trades on impersonal exchanges). 51 Second, he failed to acknowledge
that the common law recognizes many other bases for an affirmative
duty to speak, including some suspiciously close to the "fairness" rule
that Powell was intent on rejecting. 52  His incorporation was
extremely selective. 53
The irony was extended in the Court's insider trading decision
in United States v. O'Hagan.54 In endorsing the misappropriation
theory of liability, the Court accepted a proposition of startling
breadth: that an agent's concealed breach of fiduciary duty operates as
a fraud based on the agent's failure to disclose his own faithlessness. 55
Here, again, we see a strange inversion of normal reasoning. While
one might think that the primary source of duties to disclose for
purposes of the federal securities laws would be the disclosure rules
49. E.g., SEC v. Cochran, 214 F.3d 1261, 1264-1265 (10th Cir. 2000); Fortson v. Winstead,
McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1992); Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling
Partnership v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342, 347 (10th Cir. 1986); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes
& Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986).
50. See supra note 6 (citing articles discussing Chiarella's relationship to the common law).
51. Id.
52. See Richard Painter et al., Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Insider Trading After O'Hagan, 85 VA.
L. REV. 153, 208-11 (1998) (describing state of the common law disclosure duties at the time of
Chiarella). Indeed, as multiple commentators have pointed out, Justice Powell, in saying that he
was drawing on the common law in Chiarella, cited to the Restatement of Torts as authority, but
then only used one of the five different bases for a duty to disclose that the Restatement listed.
See Langevoort, supra note 45, at 12; Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider
Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341, 351 (1982); Donna M. Nagy, The "Possession vs. Use"Debate
in the Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden,
67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1195 n.310 (1999).
53. On Powell's influence, see generally A.C. Pritchard, Agency Law and Justice Powell s
Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13 (1998) [hereinafter Pritchard, Agency
Law]; A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counter-Revolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DuKE L. J. 841 (2003).
54. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
55. This incorporation of common law duties and the problems with it are described in
Painter, supra note 52, 208-211.
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promulgated by the SEC, instead we see an incorporation of common
law duties occupying a role front and center in Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence. 56
We will come back to some of the issues this kind of analysis
raises shortly. For now, consider the following. Under state law,
officers have a duty of candor vis-A-vis the board of directors.5 7 Say
then that a CEO-perhaps, Enron's Ken Lay-does not tell the board
everything material about the state of his company. In reality, for
example, he knows that apparent profitability may be based on
accounting artifices. Now, also say that Lay receives a large portion of
his salary in the form of stock and stock options granted by the board's
compensation committee. In theory, we have a deceptive act that is
presumably a breach of fiduciary duty under state law. There is also
the question of whether Lay's deception occurred in the context of the
purchase or sale of a security (an independent element under Section
10(b)), but the Court, with rulings such as its recent one in SEC v.
Zandford, has been expansive here.58 Certainly one can presume that
accurate knowledge of the company's condition might affect the
compensation decision, and so the fiduciary-duty-based claim seems
compelling. But to allow such claims would seem to allow federal
securities laws to swallow state corporate laws. And indeed, drawing
56. In U.S. v. Dial, a case involving broker nondisclosure to customers, Judge Posner
explained the rationale underlying the fiduciary basis for a duty to disclose at common law:
[W]e think there was a scheme to defraud in a rather classic sense, which is obscured only
because commodity futures trading is an arcane business - though not to these defendants.
Fraud in the common law sense of deceit is committed by deliberately misleading another by
words, by acts, or, in some instances - notably where there is a fiduciary relationship, which
creates a duty to disclose all material facts - by silence. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts §§ 105-06 (5th ed. 1984). Liability is narrower for nondisclosure than for active
misrepresentation, since the former sometimes serves a social purpose; for example, someone
who bought land from another thinking that it had oil under it would not be required to disclose
the fact to the owner, because society wants to encourage people to find out the true value of
things, and it does this by allowing them to profit from their knowledge. See Laidlaw v. Organ,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195, 4 L.Ed. 214 (1817); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and
the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1978). But if someone asks you to break a $10 bill, and
you give him two $1 bills instead of two $5's because you know he cannot read and won't know
the difference, that is fraud. Even more clearly is it fraud to fail to "level" with one to whom one
owes fiduciary [duties]. The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the fiduciary agrees to act
as his principal's alter ego rather than to assume the standard arm's length stance of traders in
a market. Hence the principal is not armed with the usual wariness that one has in dealing with
strangers; he trusts the fiduciary to deal with him as frankly as he would deal with himself - he
has bought candor.
757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
57. On the intra-corporate duty of candor, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law
Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187 (2003).
58. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 824-25 (2002). On the expansiveness of Zandford, see
SEC v. Santos, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing the broad holding in Zandford).
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from Santa Fe's teachings, the lower federal courts regularly tell us
that the securities laws are about the policing of disclosure, not
mismanagement.5 9 So, the borrowing from common law, in the place
where the borrowing seems most apt under Chiarella's teachings, is
jarring when applied as broadly as it might be. Indeed, courts have
not pushed this logic aggressively. 60 Here, we think that the courts
(correctly) perceive the need to be careful in creating an additional
obligation on the part of the company to part with information that
would otherwise be proprietary.
C. The Scope of Disclosure Obligations in a Repurchase or Sale by the
Issuer
The foregoing issue discussion sets the stage for one of the most
conceptually interesting ones under Rule 10b-5--does the issuer have
a fiduciary duty to disclose when it transacts with company
shareholders? Although fiduciary obligations in corporate law
developed in terms of saying that officers and directors owe duties to
the corporation (and indirectly, to the shareholders), modern
securities law gives ample reason to believe that the issuer as an
entity is also a fiduciary vis-A-vis the shareholders.6 1
1. Repurchases
Most lawyers, we suspect, counsel their clients that issuers
cannot engage in stock repurchases while in possession of material
nonpublic information. But legally, in light of Chiarella, that would
be so only if we assume the presence of a fiduciary duty on the part of
the issuer-an assumption most commentators and courts seem
59. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 885-86 (2002) (disclosing the Supreme
Court's unwillingness to federalize the relative rights of directors and shareholders).
60. Our expectation, for the federalism reasons articulated in the text, is that courts will
not be amenable to finding broad disclosure obligations triggered by contexts such as the grants
of options to senior executives. At least one commentator, however, has suggested that the
courts can (and should) go the other way. Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV.
835, 889 (2004) (suggesting that disclosure requirements need not unduly restrict companies
from awarding stock options).
61. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1204 (1st Cir. 1996); Freedman v.
Value Health, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 745 (D. Conn. 1997); In re SeaChange Int'l Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-
12116-DPW, 2004 WL 240317, at *12-13 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2004); Simon v. American Power, 945




prepared to make. 62 As an aside, one should note that there are no
SEC line-item disclosure rules that apply to an ordinary repurchase.6 3
This assumption presents at least two problems. To the extent
that the teaching of Chiarella is that courts are supposed to draw
disclosure duties exclusively from those fiduciary type relationships
recognized by the common law, it does not look like there is much
support for finding a direct duty running from the issuer to the
investors. If one looks to Delaware state law-after all, Delaware is
surely the dominant player in terms of articulating state corporate
law obligations--it tells us that issuers (as opposed to boards of
directors) do not owe disclosure duties to shareholders.6 4 Second, even
assuming that this duty exists, there is the problem of where the logic
of such a position takes us. Would an issuer also have a fiduciary duty
of full disclosure of all material information in the MD&A, regardless
of how narrowly SEC rules articulate such a duty? Or is there a
fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts in a proxy statement, even
if the SEC's rules do not specifically call for a particular item? In a
sense, the lower courts' reluctance to acknowledge the authority of the
SEC's disclosure rules (where present) in the context of 10b-5 duties to
disclose, in favor of deference to a few sentences regarding fiduciary
62. In addition to the recent cases such as Shaw, 82 F.3d. at 1204, there are older cases
such as: McCormick v. Fund Am. Co., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966); see also
Castellano v. Young & Rubican, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a similar duty in
the context of a closed corporation's repurchases). Treatises discussing this point include:
WILLIAM K. WANG & MARC. I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 5.2.3.3, at 297-98 (1996); DONALD
C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 3.02[1][d], at
3-6 to 3-7; Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3591-93 (3d ed. 1999). One
set of commentators, Bromberg and Lowenfels, however, question this line of reasoning. ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LOUIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §7.5 (811)(2), at
7:276-80; see also Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital From Investors, 28 J. CORP. L. 111,
118-119 (2002) (discussing the contrasting views and, specifically, the Bromberg and Lowenfels
objections). For the most part, the law review literature also assumes that issuers making
repurchases are insiders for purposes of Chiarella's "disclose or abstain" rule. Steven E. Bochner
& Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and
Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 225, 229 (2002); Nicholas J. Guttilla,
Case Comment, Securities Regulation-Disclosure of Intra-Quarter Performance Information
Constituting Extreme Departure from Public Information Required in Shelf Registration
Prospectus-Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996), 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1023, 1028-29 (1998); Donna M. Nagy, supra note 52, at 1177-78.
63. Joan Macleod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A
Call For Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2003).
64. In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp. Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court refused to
extend the fiduciary duties of disclosure owed by the corporation's directors (in the context of a
proxy fight) to the corporate defendant itself. 678 A.2d 533, 539-540 (Del. 1996); see also
Jennifer O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary
Duty of Disclosure and the Anti Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 475, 496 (2002).
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duties out of the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, causes this
result. But a determination that the issuer has a fiduciary's duty to
disclose to its shareholders would be very powerful, perhaps
overpowering, even if only applied in areas where the company was
transacting with shareholders or seeking consent from them. 65
So far as the repurchase question is concerned, the courts and
commentators confirm that such a duty likely exists, though there is
surprisingly little reflection on the conceptual problem. 66 In essence,
then, the federal courts that so assume are not only setting the
common law of fiduciary responsibility on its head, but also eliding a
hard policy question. The issuer repurchase context is different from
that of the classical insider trade; hence, a simple extension of the
classical insider's duty might be problematic. This point becomes
clearer if one thinks about what the implications of the "disclose or
abstain" rule means in the classical insider versus issuer (doing a
repurchase) contexts. Given that making full disclosure of all the
material nonpublic information at her disposal is not a viable option
for the classical insider (she would likely get promptly fired for
revealing the company's confidential information), the rule amounts to
a mandate that she abstain from trading when in possession of an
informational advantage. In other words, it is the "abstain" part of
the "disclose or abstain" rule that is at work. That seems acceptable,
given that the position of the Court appears to be that classical
insiders should not trade based on informational advantages gained as
a result of their corporate positions.
But things are more complicated with an issuer repurchase.
Here, the disclosure rule operates not as an injunction against
trading, but as a real disclosure rule. In other words, there might be
circumstances where the company actually needs to do a repurchase
and, if so, it will have to figure out how to make disclosure of all
material information, a difficult task to say the least.6 7 At the same
65. One recent case, State of New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., seemed to recognize this issue in
its rejection of the plaintiffs request that Chiarella be applied to the issuer context. 314 F. Supp.
2d 1119, 1138-39 (D. Kan. 2004).
66. See supra note 63.
67. There is an argument to be made that the disclosure requirements that the insider
trading analogy imposes on companies results in disadvantaging a set of socially useful
transactions. For example, both the SEC and the NYSE have acknowledged the important role
that corporate buybacks serve in 'enhancing liquidity during extreme market downturns,' such
as the crashes of October 1987 and October 1997. Matthew J. Gardella, Stock Buybacks: Legal
Issues Under the Federal Securities Laws and Other Practical Considerations, 13 INSIGHTS: CORP
& SEC. L. ADVISOR, Mar. 1999, at 2. In addition, repurchases are also thought to be a valuable
mechanism of credible communication for the company vis-a-vis its investors (where the
repurchase signals the company's view that its securities are undervalued). David Ikenberry et
al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 181, 183 (1995);
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time, there are a number of reasons why the issuer repurchase context
brings up many of the same concerns that the classical insider trader
context did. The transaction involves anonymous trading on an
exchange; it is generally done in order to take advantage of an
informational advantage over shareholders that is gained because of
inside access; the result of the repurchase is to solidify the position of
the corporate managers (and the wallets of a subset of the
shareholders) at the expense of a less informed group of shareholders;
and finally, as noted earlier, this is an area in which the SEC has not
specified any disclosure rules. For now, our only point is to show how
the interesting and important questions raised by recognition of this
duty simply have been lost from sight.
2. Sales by the Issuer
Now let us switch directions and ask whether, assuming that
the issuer does indeed have a fiduciary duty to disclose in a
repurchase, that same logic leads to the conclusion that there is a
comparable disclosure obligation when the issuer is selling. The
problem is illustrated by asking whether, assuming that the issuer is
a fiduciary, it has a comparably broad duty of disclosure when selling
securities to investors. In Chiarella, the Supreme Court explained
that it made little sense to distinguish between purchases and sales so
far as fiduciary duty is concerned, suggesting that the corporate
fiduciary has as much duty to disclose to those who become
shareholders through their purchases as to those who were
shareholders before their sales.6 If that is the case, and the Court
really meant for the fiduciary principle that it articulated in the
individual insider trading cases to apply to corporate issuers as well-
it would seem that the issuer should have a duty of full disclosure of
all material information in all offerings. When the offering is a
registered public offering, the problem is confounded with the question
of whether the SEC's already expansive requirements produce
disclosure duties. That was the precise issue in Shaw, where the
court's attempts to struggle through the disclosure problem in front of
it brought to the surface the logical problems with applying the
fiduciary principles in the offering context.
Shaw involved a public offering where the offering company
failed to disclose that the results for its current quarter (that was
Cf. Heminway, supra note 63, at 1175-76 (suggesting that issuer repurchases enhance
shareholder value by reducing the number of shares outstanding, causing the market price to
rise, and avoiding the need to use dividends as a means of distributing earnings).
68. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980). See note 150, infra.
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about three-quarters of the way complete at the time of the offering)
were significantly worse than those for prior comparable quarters.69
Had investors known this information, they may well have perceived
the company as going into a new slump as opposed to coming out of
one. The problem for the investors who were suing, however, was that
their primary basis for claiming that the information should have
been disclosed came out of the SEC's disclosure requirements as
stated in Form S-3.70 The case law at the time seemed to suggest that
these line-item disclosure requirements did not produce duties to
disclose.7 1 The First Circuit, which appeared sympathetic to the
plaintiffs' claims, was faced with the task of justifying its
determination that the SEC's line-item rules could indeed produce
such a duty to disclose. In order to do that, the court had to deal with
the mass of case law suggesting that the primary, if not only, source of
the affirmative duty to disclose was the presence of a fiduciary type
relationship. The Shaw court did that by constructing an argument
that, even while finding a duty to disclose arising out of the SEC's
line-item requirements, it remained consistent with Chiarella's
prescription that the only basis for an affirmative duty to disclose
under Section 10(b) was a violation of a fiduciary-type duty to speak.
It is this secondary argument, which the Shaw court felt compelled to
use, that produces complications.
To argue that it was remaining consistent with Chiarella's
teachings, the Shaw court looked to issuer repurchase cases and to
what the commentators had said regarding them. The cases and
commentary seemed clear on the proposition that issuers owed
shareholders from whom they were repurchasing securities a fiduciary
duty to disclose all material information. 72 If such a duty existed in
the repurchase context, the Shaw court then reasoned, it made sense
that an equally broad duty to disclose all material information existed
in the public offering context. 73
69. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (D. Mass. 1996).
70. Id. at 1205.
71. For a background to Shaw, see Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear That a
Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 737
(1999); Guttilla, supra note 62; Note, Living in a Material World, Corporate Disclosure of
Midquarter Results, 110 HARV. L. REV. 923, 925-28 (1997).
72. Shaw, 82 F.3d. at 1204 (citing materials on the issuer's disclosure obligations in the
repurchase context).
73. Shaw explains:
Just as an individual insider with material nonpublic information about pending
merger or license negotiations could not purchase his company's securities without
making disclosure, the company itself may not engage in such a purchase of its own
stock, if it is in possession of such undisclosed information. By extension, a
comparable rule should apply to issuers engaged in a stock offering. Otherwise, a
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The problem now was that Shaw appeared to have opened
Pandora's box. By making the point that the issuer was a fiduciary
vis-A-vis the shareholders in the repurchase context, it followed
logically that the issuer was also a fiduciary vis-A-vis prospective
shareholders in the offering context. That, in turn, meant that all
future plaintiffs would be able to cite to Shaw and claim that, at least
in the offering context, they were entitled to sue for all material
omissions and not just those that were mandated by the SEC's line-
item rules.
This was what happened. In a number of cases, plaintiffs
claimed that, at least in the offering context, they were entitled to sue
for all material omissions.7 4 We suspect that a number of judges,
faced with these claims, quickly realized that to recognize such a
broad duty to disclose would eviscerate the SEC's extensive and
detailed disclosure apparatus that applied to the various kinds of
offerings. Hence, we then saw panels of both the First and the
Eleventh Circuits, in Cooperman and Oxford Asset Management,
respond that plaintiffs were reading Shaw too expansively. 75 In the
offering context, both panels explained, one had to look to whether a
specific disclosure requirement was violated to determine whether
plaintiffs could sue based on an omission.76
There are multiple problems with the rejections of the broad
readings of Shaw in the aforementioned cases. First, both courts cite
to language in Shaw that "mere possession of material nonpublic
information does not create a duty to disclose," but they take it out of
corporate issuer selling its own securities would be left free to exploit its informational
trading advantage, at the expense of investors, by delaying disclosure of material
nonpublic negative news until after completion of the offering.
Id. at 1204 (citations omitted). There is at least one prior case from the Ninth Circuit that
appears to directly support this reasoning, albeit in a footnote. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F. 2d
633, 652 n.23 (9th Cir. 1980) (extending the "incipient shareholder" logic from Judge Hand's
decision in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951) to negotiations by a promoter with
prospective investors considering the purchase of limited partnership interests).
74. And some district court cases seemed to accept the argument that the public offering
context did indeed create extremely broad duties to disclose. See Fitzer v. Sec. Dynamics Tech.
Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 12, 26-27 (D. Mass. 2000); see also Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., No. Civ.A.
96-12272-DPW, 1998 WL 953726, at *12 (D. Mass. May 27, 1998) (accepting, in a Section 11
case, the plaintiffs' argument about the broad duty created in Shaw, but rejecting the claim on
materiality grounds); Freedman v. Value Health, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 745 (accepting, in the merger
context, the argument that Shaw appeared to create a broad duty to disclose, but also granting
plaintiffs' duty to disclose argument on the basis of its claim that Item 10(b) created the
necessary disclosure obligation).
75. Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 50-52 (1st Cir. 1999); Oxford Asset Mgmt.,
Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1182, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). For a recent district court opinion
along these lines, see In re SeaChange Int'l Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-12116-DPW, 2004 WL 240317, at
*11-12 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2004).
76. Cooperman, 171 F. 3d at 49-50; Oxford Asset Mgmt, 297 F.3d at 1190-91.
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context. Shaw does indeed say that, but it does so as a general
proposition.7 7 The court then tackles the more specific context of the
public offering, and that is where it develops the analogy to the
repurchase cases and concludes with the broad proposition that in the
context of an offering, all material information has to be disclosed. 78
Neither Cooperman nor Oxford Asset go anywhere near an attempt to
explain why the Shaw analogy to the repurchase cases was wrong.
We suspect that they did not do so because attempting to reject the
Shaw reasoning on this point would have required them to say that
the application of the fiduciary logic from Chiarella to the issuer
context was incorrect, and they were unwilling to go anywhere near
an argument of that import.79  Thus, the issue of whether the
conception of the issuer as a fiduciary is valid remains alive for
purposes of duty questions. Are plaintiffs entitled to point to the
repurchase cases and Shaw and claim that they are entitled to the
disclosure of all material information in any public offering?
This issue is also important in defining the scope of the issuer's
obligations in an exempt offering.80 If we assume the fiduciary duty,
then there is a disclosure obligation that extends with much the same
breadth as a public offering. If we deny the fiduciary obligation, we
have to explain how that would square with the presumed rule as to
issuer repurchases. To date, none of these uncertainties have been
resolved.
For us, the repurchase/issuance distinction falls nicely into the
property/tort distinction. With a company repurchase on the open
market, it is hard to see how investors could argue that the
transaction created an expectation of disclosure (assuming that the
transaction was on an anonymous exchange). So in mandating
disclosure here, the courts are working in the property realm (perhaps
rightly, given the analogy to traditional insider trading). With an
offering, by contrast, there is, in effect, a face-to-face transaction. The
77. The citation that Shaw provides on this point is to Roeder v. Alfus, a nonoffering context
case. Shaw, 82. F3d. at 1201.
78. Id. at 1203-1204.
79. The recent case, State of New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (D. Kan.
2004), has much the same analysis. Like Cooperman and Oxford Asset Mgmt, the Sprint case
also does not explicitly reject the Shaw analysis. But what it does do is to explicitly say that the
Chiarella analogy does not work in the issuer context. Id. at 1138-39. Instead, the court suggests
the SEC's explicit disclosure regulations govern in the issuer context. Id. at 1128-1138.
80. Harry Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly From Investors: What Disclosure Does
Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 126-127 (2002) ("Chiarella need not stand as a barrier to
a lower court's adoption of an intermediate standard of required disclosure, under Rule lOb-5, for




investor knows she is purchasing from the company and has certain
expectations-based on SEC rules-that the court decides whether to
protect. The latter is tort-type analysis. Drawing an analogy from the
former context of property analysis to the latter, tort analysis is
unlikely to work.
D. Duties Arising from a Prior or Contemporaneous Disclosure
We come now to another area of obvious confusion - situations
where the alleged fraud arises from something the defendant actually
said. Many nondisclosure cases are variations on the half-truth
doctrine, where the inquiry is whether in light of what was omitted,
what was said was misleading. As one of us has explained at length
in a separate article, this is best seen as a "tort reasoning" question,
not a property-type one.81
So understood, we see that the half-truth doctrine is a close
cousin to the most controversial "duty" doctrine under Rule 10b-5, the
duty to update.8 2 Here, the company makes a statement that is
correct when made. Later, however, new information arises that
shows the earlier statement to be problematic. For example, the
company announces that things are going swimmingly with its new
product. Later tests reveal, however, that there are some glitches in
the product. If the earlier statement is deemed to still be "alive" in the
minds of the investors-that is, investors continue to rely on the
accuracy of the statement beyond the point at which it was actually
made--some courts will find a duty to update. S3 A brief description of
81. Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and
Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 93 (1999).
82. For a smattering of the many lengthy discussions of the duty to update, see 1 EDWARD
GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS
§ 3.09 [5] (2d ed. 2004); Porter, supra note 6, at 2207; Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, The Status of the
Duty to Update, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 605 (1998); Dale A. Oesterle, The Inexorable
March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: 'Are We
There Yet?" 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 136-38 (1998); Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer's Duty
Under Rule lOb-5 to Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
289, 315 (1991); Gordon Jones II, In re Time Warner, Inc., Securities Litigation: The Second
Circuit Revisits Rule lOb-5-The Duties to Correct, Update, and Disclose Alternative Business
Plans, 28 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1029-30 (1994); John E. Hayes, III, Note, Securities, Lies &
Videotape: Backman v. Polaroid and the Duty to Update, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 951, 953-55 (1991);
Carl W. Schneider, Duty to Update: Does a Snapshot Disclosure Require the Commencement of a
Motion Picture?, 4 INSIGHTS: CORP & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Oct. 1990, at 10; Dennis Block et al., A
Post-Polaroid Snapshot of the Duty to Correct Disclosure, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 140-43
(1991).
83. Ross v. A.H. Robins, 465 F. Supp. 904, 906-907 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (explaining that a duty
to revise/correct a statement that was accurate when originally made arises when the statement
remains "alive" in the minds of investors and they continue to rely on its accuracy); In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997) (same).
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evolution of the doctrine will help flesh out what courts understand it
to be about.
The adoption of the duty in the securities context first occurred
in a pair of cases in the district courts of New York that utilized much
the same rationale as the common law. SEC v. Shattuck Mining
involved a company that announced an imminent acquisition that
subsequently did not pan out.8 4 Although the statement was accurate
when made, the court held that the company had an obligation to
update the public regarding the later development.8 5 Similarly, in
Ross v. A.H. Robins, the company in question had made a number of
positive statements about its contraceptive products and then failed to
tell the public about subsequently arising products liability lawsuits
and negative safety reports.8 6 The court explained that there was an
obligation to revise the earlier statements, even if originally accurate,
as long as investors in the market continued to rely on the accuracy of
the first statement.8 7
Ever since the duty to update was recognized in these early
cases, one question has continued to bother courts and commentators:
What is its scope? In order to set up our discussion of the confusion in
this area, we briefly mention some of the leading circuit court cases on
the matter. Most prominent are the First Circuit's two decisions in
Backman v. Polaroid.88 The court initially articulated what was
viewed as an extremely broad obligation to update.8 9 Polaroid had
made but brief mention of its new product, Polavision, in an otherwise
glowing third quarter report (although a photograph of the product
was on the cover of the report). 90 Subsequently, the company took
steps to discontinue production on Polavision, but made no disclosure
of the matter to the public.91 The original panel held that a jury could
have found the company's silence, in the face of its initial minimal
84. 297 F. Supp. 470, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
85. Id. at 475.
86. 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
87. Id. at 906-907. As an aside, although both the Ross and Shattuck cases articulate the
obligation of the company to revise its earlier statements as an obligation to "correct," we classify
them as update cases because the obligations in question arose even assuming that the original
statements were accurate when made. Brill, supra note 82, at 620-22.
88. 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 787 (1st Cir. Jan. 23, 1990) [hereinafter Polaroid I], withdrawn
and substituted opinion, 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (hereinafter Polaroid II).
89. For commentary on the case from that period, see Edward Brodsky, The Duty to Update
Information, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1990, at 3; Schneider, supra note 82, at 2; Thomas J. Dougherty,
Backman v. Polaroid: The First Circuit Declines to Expand the Duty of Disclosure, 34 BOSTON
B.J. 8, 8 (1990).




statement and the subsequent negative news, misleading.92 An en
banc panel of the First Circuit, however, reversed the decision and
held that the initial statement about Polavision had been too minimal
to give rise to a duty to update. 93 It also went on to say that while
there might be "special circumstances" where the initial statement
could induce continued reliance by investors, such a triggering
statement would have to be forward looking.9 4
The Second Circuit, in Time Warner, also recognized the
possibility of liability for a failure to update. 95 There, the company
had hyped its strategic alliances as a source of debt financing. When
this strategy fell through, the company began pursuing the possibility
of doing an equity offering to raise the necessary capital.96 The court,
while recognizing a duty to update, held that the initial statement
regarding strategic alliances was insufficiently specific to give rise to a
duty to update. 97 The court stated, nonetheless, that a switch to an
alternative method of financing might give rise to such a duty.98 Both
Backman and Time Warner were struggling with the scope question:
that is, exploring what types of initial statements produce the kind of
investor reliance that requires updating.
Following on the heels of Time Warner, the Third Circuit
issued two decisions that tackled the duty to update. In the first,
Burlington, the court attempted a different approach from the one
used in Time Warner and Backman, using a technique different even
from the Third Circuit's own prior decisions on the matter, Greenfield
and Phillips Petroleum.99 The prior approach had been to ask simply
whether the failure to update had the potential to mislead reasonable
investors; the work courts were doing in these cases involved
separating the types of statements and circumstances that required
updating, because investors might be misled, versus those that did
not. Burlington flipped the question, and instead articulated the key
question as whether the company's initial statement contained an
implicit representation that the company would update investors or
not. 100 In a sense, the approach was more based in contract than tort.
92. Id. at *26-30.
93. Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 17.
94. Id. at 17-18.
95. In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 1993).
96. Id. at 262.
97. Id. at 267.
98. Id. at 268.
99. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431-34 (3d Cir. 1997);
Greenfield v. Heublein Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 753-54 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec.
Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1239-42, 1245-47 (3d Cir. 1989).
100. 114 F.3d at 1431.
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But the Burlington court did not seem to think that it was doing
anything different from the prior cases and cited to them as
support. 1 1 After all, if there was a promise to update investors as to
important developments, silence would suggest to investors that there
had been no important developments. And if there was no initial
promise to speak, silence would not be misleading. Ordinary earnings
forecasts, the Burlington court concluded, did not contain an implicit
promise to update, whereas statements about major events such as
mergers, might. 10 2
A few months later, the Third Circuit had occasion to consider
the duty to update again. But this panel of the Third Circuit appeared
to find the Burlington court's approach wanting (in that it did not
even cite it in its discussion of the updating question, even though it
could have used the Burlington approach to arrive at the same
result).'0 3 Instead, the second panel returned to the tort approach of
simply asking whether investors had been misled. 0 4 The company in
question had made repeated statements about its debt-to-equity ratio
and its intentions to keep it within a certain range. 0 5 There was an
impending merger, however, and the company failed to disclose to the
public that it had decided to abandon its planned debt-to-equity ratio
targets. 0 6 This failure to speak, the Weiner court held, violated the
duty to update. 107
In sum, the dominant approach among the circuits that
recognize the duty to update simply appears to be to investigate
whether investors are misled by the failure to update a certain
statement. There are some courts that answer this question more
narrowly than others, but the analysis, Burlington and its progeny
aside, tends to be tort-like.
The Seventh Circuit, rejecting the duty to update, has taken a
different tack. At the heart of the duty to update is the question of
how it can be fraudulent not to speak (or, here, to update). The
Seventh Circuit has rejected the viability of the duty to update
101. Id. at 1431-34; see also Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Burlington for both the proposition that the duty to update "concerns statements that, although
reasonable at the time made, become misleading when viewed in the context of subsequent
events" (the old standard), as well as the proposition that the prior statement only becomes
actionable if it contained an "implicit factual representation that remained 'alive' in the minds of
investors as a continuing representation") (citations omitted).
102. Oran, 226 F.3d at 286.
103. Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 316-319.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 316-318.
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precisely because it could not think of an answer.108 But, as described,
the courts that have recognized the duty have offered an answer: the
earlier statement, so long as it remains alive, operates as a continuing
representation of its accuracy. If there is a statement of this type,
then there is detrimental reliance-a perfect example of tort-type
thinking. So articulated, the duty to update would be firmly grounded
but relatively narrow in scope, because most corporate statements are
not the sort that could be viewed as a continuing representation. Most
speak to the moment or for a very short period of time. 10 9 In this
sense, the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the duty to update might be
overbroad but is understandable.
But the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the duty to update has
not been simply a rejection of the idea that there exists a subset of
statements that could remain alive beyond the point at which they
were actually made. Instead, the circuit has looked to at least two
different policy explanations. In Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., the
court explained that the securities laws approached matters from an
ex ante perspective that was inconsistent with the kinds of hindsight-
based determinations that the duty to update required (at least, with
respect to forward-looking statements). 1 0  This concern about
hindsight was restated by Judge Posner in Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.,
where the duty to update was rejected even more emphatically."1
108. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1995);
Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997); Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d
806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001).
109. And indeed, along these lines, the Third Circuit, in Burlington, explained that there
could be no duty to update routine forecasts, although there might be a duty to update
statements about major transactions such as mergers. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir. 1997).
110. Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331-32. The court explained that the policies underlying Section
10(b) "implicitly preclude basing liability on circumstances that arise after the speaker makes
the statement." Id. Invoking the hindsight bias, the court asserted that "[t]he securities laws
typically do not act as a Monday Morning Quarterback" and went on to explain that the
securities laws " 'approach matters from an ex ante perspective: just as a statement true when
made does not become fraudulent because things unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement
materially false when made does not become acceptable because it happens to come true.' " Id.
(citation omitted). For a detailed treatment of invocations of the hindsight bias problem by
courts in the securities fraud context more generally, see Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight,
98 Nw. U. L. REV. 773, 796-813 (2003).
111. Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 744-746 (explaining that "Centel cannot be faulted for having
failed to tell the stock market that there would be only seven bidders and their bids would be no
good. Had it known this from the start, it wouldn't have announced an auction. Hindsight is not
the test for securities fraud."). Judge Posner also suggests that the PSLRA might have signaled
the death of the duty to update. But that is a difficult argument to make, given that while there
is a point in the PSLRA where the provision explicitly says that nothing in that subsection is to
be construed to create a duty to update, there is also nothing that disclaims the preexisting
judge-created duty. Brill, supra note 82, at 657.
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Taking a somewhat different approach in Gallagher v. Abbott
Laboratories, Judge Easterbrook explained that creation of duty on
this matter was the province of the SEC. 112 The SEC currently
requires periodic reporting at quarterly intervals. An updating duty
would be, in effect, a court mandate that reporting be continuous, and
the Seventh Circuit concluded that courts did not have the authority
to impose that mandate-only the SEC or Congress did. 1 3
Among the interesting points evident in the contrast between
the Seventh Circuit's approach to the updating duty and that of the
earlier mentioned circuits is that while the Seventh Circuit looks to
the big picture question of whether it would be appropriate to create a
duty,114 the other circuits, for the most part, simply look to see
whether investors were misled. 115  The former seems more like
property-type thinking and the latter is tort-type thinking.
This point about what the Seventh Court is doing,11 6 as
compared with the approach of the other circuits, is clearer when one
looks to the fact that even while rejecting the duty to update, the
Seventh Circuit has embraced its sibling, the duty to correct.11 7 The
duty to correct is an obligation to correct statements of historical fact
that were erroneous when made, although unknowingly so. As with
the duty to update, there was no fraud at the time that the original
statement was made. It is the failure to report the subsequent arrival
of new information, showing the earlier statement to be erroneous,
that is said to be potentially fraudulent. The duty to correct, like the
duty to update, requires taking an ex post perspective (indeed, one
also susceptible to the hindsight bias problem) and has not received
explicit SEC approval as constituting part of its periodic disclosure
apparatus. Yet, even though these difficulties with the duty to correct
were among the reasons given by the Seventh Circuit for rejecting the
duty to update, that court is comfortable with the duty to correct.
112. Gallagher, 269 F.3d at 808.
113. Id.
114. In doing so, the court implicitly examined what the costs of making error-prone
hindsight decisions are versus the benefits in terms of fraud prevention.
115. Although the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hillson Partners v. Adage is not quite the
explicit rejection of the duty to update that is contained in Stransky, Eisenstadt, and Gallagher,
it also used policy reasons - that a duty to update would simply be too onerous for companies to
comply with -to back up its rejection of the updating claim. 42 F.3d 204, 219(4th Cir. 1994).
116. It appears that the Fourth Circuit may be taking an approach similar to that of the
Seventh Circuit. Id.
117. Asher v. Baxter, Case Nos. 02 C 5608, 5742, 5807, 6085, 6175, & 6267, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12905, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2003) (making the distinction between the duty to update
and the duty to correct).
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The explanation for the Seventh Circuit's comfort with the duty
to correct and not the duty to update presumably derives from some
judgment that the former involves few costs and more benefits than
that latter; perhaps the hindsight bias problems are fewer and the
inconsistency with the SEC's periodic reporting system smaller. That
judgment may be correct. 118 Indeed, one can tell a plausible story
about how the person who makes the mistake is the one best able (and
most likely) to ferret it out or, alternatively, that there needs to be a
disincentive for people who may be tempted to claim that they
innocently made mistakes. The point we hope is clear here, though, is
that all of the aforementioned justifications for the Seventh Circuit's
position rest on efficiency or fairness estimations about the value of
one disclosure rule versus another. In other words, the Seventh
Circuit is engaging in property-type thinking when deciding to create
expectations regarding correction and to negate expectations
regarding updating. That, then, is in contrast with the approach of
118. We are skeptical, though. In practice, it seems hard to distinguish between a correction
case and an update case, and both seem susceptible to the hindsight bias. The following example
will help illustrate:
Take a publicly traded drug company that has a new hair loss prevention drug about which
investors are excited. The CEO makes a statement that the company is optimistic about the
company's financial prospects as a result of the success that the drug is expected to have. At the
time that the statement is made, the company has before it a study suggesting that a small
fraction of the patients in the trials had developed serious intestinal disorders. Subsequently, as
more tests are done, it turns out that there is a causal link between the use of the drug and the
intestinal disorder. In hindsight, it looks like ignoring the initial warning sign was a mistake.
Does the company have a duty to correct? After all, they did have the information about some
intestinal disorders showing up at the time of the initial disclosure. In addition, what if it turns
out that some years prior there had been an article in the JAMA that had reported a possible
connection between hair loss and intestinal disorders? The company's researchers had been
unaware of the article at the time of the CEO's statement but discovered it later as they began
investigating the matter more. At least to us, it seems unclear whether this is an update case or
a correction case. And it is even less clear why one should produce liability and the other should
not. Indeed, there is one recent case where the Seventh Circuit itself appeared to struggle over
this classification problem. In In re HealthCare Compare Corp., the company had made an
optimistic statement that was thought to be correct at the time made (or, at least, there was not
evidence to demonstrate otherwise). 75 F.3d 276, 281-83 (7th Cir. 1996). At the time the
statement was made, however, the company was collecting the necessary information and when
that was compiled, it showed the prior statement to be in error. Id. at 281. The defendants
pointed to the Seventh Circuit's earlier cases, such as Stransky, saying that there was no duty to
update forward looking statements. Id. at 282. The court, however, explained that this was not
a case where some unexpected event had occurred to make an earlier made optimistic statement
incorrect. Instead, this case involved the routine collection of information and, therefore,
disclosure of the new information was required under the duty to correct. Id. at 283. The
Seventh Circuit, in order to make the distinction between the duty to update and correct, had to
make another distinction between unexpected intervening events and expected ones. And it is
not clear that this is a useful distinction (that is, saying that expected events have to be reported
on, but not unexpected ones).
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the other circuits to take expectations as given and ask whether the
silence in question was misleading.
E. The "Flexible Duty" and How it (Almost) Got Lost
Starting with the Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams in 1974, a
handful of courts set out what they called a "flexible duty" to
disclose. 119  The duty was applied as a function of the specific
transactional context and is aimed at determining both the duty to
disclose and scienter. Courts used a multifactor test and examined
the following: (1) the informational asymmetry between the parties
and their relationship; (2) their relative access to information; (3) who
initiated the transaction; (4) the benefit to the defendant from
withholding the information; and (5) the defendant's awareness of
reliance by the counterparty. 120 The multifactor analysis was an
amalgam of the various common law sources of the duty to disclose.
At bottom, it amounted to asking the question of whether the
circumstances were such that the counterparty expected that certain
information, if possessed by the other side, would be disclosed. 121
Versions of the Ninth Circuit's flexible duty test were picked up in the
Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. 22 But its import has always
been unclear in the light of Chiarella's insistance on the need to find a
fiduciary-type duty. 23 In other words, the question has been: Does
119. 495 F.2d 724, 730-36 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681-83 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (applying an approach similar to the flexible duty
approach in looking to see whether there was a special relationship that could justify finding a
duty to disclose). For additional background on the flexible duty and the first decade of cases
that applied it, see Fishman, supra note 11, at 275-278 (1987) (describing the flexible duty to
disclose in the context of the Court's decisions in cases such as Chiarella and Dirks).
120. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979); Spectrum Fin. Cos. v.
Marconsult Inc., 608 F.2d 377, 381-82 (9th Cir. 1979).
121. For a recent discussion of these factors and their importance at common law, see Melvin
A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1645, 1648 (2004).
122. Sheftelman v. N. L. Industries, Inc., Civ. A. No. 84-3199, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15842,
at *15-16, 27-34 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 1987).
123. See Fishman, supra note 119, at 275-78 (explaining the narrow view of the sources of
the duty in the post.Chiarella period, that viewed fiduciary duties as the only source of duties to
disclose and the broader view that included the flexible duty as a possible source). For examples
of post.Chiarella cases applying both Chiarella and the flexible duty, see City of Harrisburg v.
Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp. 463, 473-74 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp.
1465, 1488 (D. Or. 1985); Marrero v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), 487 F. Supp. 568, 574 (E.D. La.
1980). In a number of these cases, even though the court cites to the flexible duty, it is not clear
that a flexible duty violation is enough to produce a violation for purposes of Section 10(b) in the
absence of a Chiarella-type fiduciary duty violation. But see Bradford Trust Co., 621 F. Supp.
463 (suggesting that the two sources of duties can exist independently). But, if there is the need
for a Chiarella-type fiduciary duty to be violated, it is not clear at all what work the court's
citation to the flexible duty is doing. For recent examples of this confusion, see Ziemba v.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the flexible duty operate as an independent source of the duty to
disclose or is it only applicable as a means to determine whether a
fiduciary-type relationship exists? 24 Interestingly enough, at least as
a formal doctrinal matter, the source of that disappearance was not
Chiarella (or, more specifically, an interpretation of Chiarella that
said that the only source of the duty to disclose was the presence of a
fiduciary-type relationship). Indeed, the flexible duty survived for at
least ten years after Chiarella was decided.
The source of the disappearance (or at least, the diminishment)
of the flexible duty was a 1991 decision out of the Ninth Circuit itself,
Titan v. Hollinger Corp., where the court interpreted the Supreme
Court to have rejected the flexible duty on the grounds that it was
based on a negligence standard. 25 But if one looks at the language in
Hollinger, and the Supreme Court opinion that it cites, Ernst & Ernst
v. Hoch/elder, it is evident that the Court was talking only about the
scienter requirement, not the duty to disclose.1 26 The Supreme Court,
in Hoch[elder, did say that a section 10(b) suit required the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant had scienter. 27 But it said nothing
about the duty to disclose. Yet Hollinger began the process of
rejecting the flexible duty as a test for scienter. 128 At least one circuit
court has forcefully called attention to this puzzle regarding the
disappearance of the flexible duty, 129 but few others have picked up on
it.
That one case-Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves130-is worth
considering. Reves involved an Arkansas cooperative that issued
notes to a large number of investors. When the investment turned
south, the disgruntled investors sued the accountants, among
others.1 31 On remand from the Supreme Court, which determined
that the instruments at issue were securities, the Eighth Circuit faced
Cascade Intern Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2001); Paracor Finance Inc. v. General
Electric Capital Corp., 79 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1996).
124. Compare Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the flexible
duty operates as an independent source of the duty to disclose) with Paracor Fin. Inc., 96 F.3d
1151 (using the flexible duty as a test to determine the presence of a fiduciary-type relationship
of the type prescribed by Chiarella) and SEC v. TLC Inv. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1154 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same).
125. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (rejecting
the flexible duty test because it embraces a negligence standard).
126. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-96 (1976); Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1570.
127. Scienter was a state of mind constituting knowledge of the violation or at least
recklessness toward the possibility of such a violation. Id. at 194-96.
128. Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1570.
129. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1315-23.
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the question of whether the accountants had had a duty to disclose to
investors a fuller picture regarding the cooperative's fortunes.132 The
court applied the flexible duty and found that the duty had indeed
been violated. Among the factors that appeared to be important to the
court were the facts that the investors were farmers in Arkansas, the
prominent accountants had made multiple appearances at the
cooperative's meeting, and the accountants were fully aware of the
cooperative's problems, but said nothing to warn the investors. 133
There was no preexisting fiduciary-type duty between the accountants
and the investors, but the court found that the overall picture
suggested that the accountants' silence had been misleading. 134 In
other words, the transactional context was such that the farmers
expected that the accountants would inform them if there were
problems with their investment in the cooperative's notes.
And indeed, if one looks beyond the insider trading and issuer
contexts, we find evidence that courts have embraced the transaction-
based duty in other contexts. When broker-dealers transact with
customers, for example, there is assumed to be an implicit
representation that the securities in question are appropriate for the
customer. 13 5 Also, in the secondary liability context covering lawyers,
accountants, and other secondary participants, one often sees
reference to some kind of flexible duty.136 For example, in Ziemba v.
132. Id. at 1329-32.
133. Id.
134. The court does say that the context was such that the investors reposed "trust and
confidence" in the accountants. Id. at 1331 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232
(1980)). This reference to "trust and confidence" was likely an attempt to suggest that the court
was staying consistent with the duty parameters set forth by Chiarella. But to look at the facts
is to realize that there was no pre-existing relationship between the investors and accountants
that would suggest that the former had reposed "trust and confidence" in the latter in a fiduciary
sense. Instead, it simply is that the circumstances suggested that silence on the part of the
accountants was likely to be misleading. And we see that at least some later cases, for example
Reves, stand for the proposition that a duty to disclose can be created either by finding a
fiduciary-type duty, as in Chiarella, or by finding the flexible duty factors violated. 937 F.2d at
1329-31; Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991).
135. Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 184, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that
"[t]here exists an implied representation that broker-dealers charge their customers securities
prices that are reasonably related to the prices charged in an open and competitive market").
For a discussion of the case law on disclosure obligations by brokers when making
recommendations, see Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 688-91 (1996).
136. Cynthia A. Bedrick, Defining the Duty: Attorneys' Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 74 IND.
L. J. 1297, 1306-1312, 1318-1320 (1999) (describing thirteen different approaches that courts
have taken to the duty question in the lawyer obligation context - many of which reject the
narrow fiduciary duty approach); see also Robert J. Haft, Liability of Attorneys and Accountants
for Securities Transactions, in OPINIONS IN SEC TRANSACTIONS, at 777, 783 (PLI Corp. Law &
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Cascade International Inc., the Eleventh Circuit, while rejecting the
fraud claims against the lawyers and accountants who had helped
prepare the problematic offering documents, suggested that a duty to
disclose could arise if the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that the
investors had relied on the expertise of these secondary actors. 137 This
reasoning was very much in line with Reves. That said, it must be
noted that these references to the flexible duty have greatly
diminished in the period after the Court's decision eliminating aiding
and abetting liability to primary violators under Section 10(b) in
Central Bank in 1994.138 The larger question, though, is why, if
transaction or context-based duties have been considered appropriate
in these other contexts, have they not survived in Section 10(b)
jurisprudence regarding issuer obligations? As noted, using such a
duty would certainly help courts avoid much of the confusion that they
now face when they have to twist and turn, borrowing from state
fiduciary principles to create or fail to create duties in contexts such as
that of a public offering or a repurchase.
The reluctance of courts to embrace the flexible duty doctrine,
we suspect, has been out of a fear that doing so might create
additional obligations for companies to disclose proprietary
information. But, as Reves itself illustrates, the flexible duty applies
only as a function of specific transactional context. That is, one must
consider whether the company, law firm, or accountants involved have
created a reasonable expectation of disclosure. Absent the defendant's
creation of this expectation, there is no duty. In other words, this is
properly a tort analysis, not property analysis.
III. CLEARING UP THE CONFUSION
We hope we have demonstrated the confusion in the law. Our
goal now is to sort out some of the doctrinal conflicts that we have
surveyed and to see if we can simplify the analysis. The following
guidelines should help.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7099, 1995). One recent article suggests that the
direction the cases are taking is towards narrowing duties. See Peter Kostant, Sacred Cows or
Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in Justifying Some of the Current Norms of Transactional
Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49, 64-71 (2001) (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's recent
decision in Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 488 (4th Cir. 1991), which refused to find lawyer
liability for nondisclosure in the absence of a fiduciary-type relationship).
137. 256 F.3d 1194, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001).
138. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180
(1994). We suspect that in many ways, the current debate over the placement of the line
between primary and secondary liability is really a revisiting of the duty question under a
different guise.
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A. Insider Trading is a Special Subject Under Rule 10b-5, and the
Holdings and Dicta from Insider Trading Cases Should Not Be
Imported to Non-insider Trading Cases
In many ways, much of the confusion in the case law on the
duty to disclose comes from Chiarella's dicta that duty is central and
arises only when there is a pre-existing fiduciary relationship between
the parties. Read in context, this dictum was addressed to the unique
problem of working out an appropriate solution to the insider trading
problem in a world where informational imbalances abound and
markets reward prompt information discovery. The fiduciary
principle was chosen not because it was the only norm available but
because the Court thought it captured the desired line of demarcation:
those with a fiduciary duty of loyalty ought not put their interests
before those of the shareholders to whom they owe that duty. The
Court believed any broader or fuzzier line-such as one based simply
on fairness-would be overbroad and chill too much acceptable trading
behavior in the markets. 139
Such a reading suggests that the holding and dicta in Chiarella
are unlikely to be helpful in solving different 10b-5 problems, such as
the issuer's duty to disclose. The many courts that have assumed
otherwise have sown the seeds of confusion. Other 10b-5 issues
involve a very different mix of interests, and as a result there is no
reason to assume that the "fiduciary breach" or "wrongdoer" line of
demarcation is the right one.
We would say the same about the misappropriation theory. As
we have seen, the underlying "duty to disclose" principle articulated in
O'Hagan has immense potential breadth, capturing the full range of
concealed fiduciary misconduct touching on the purchase or sale of
securities. 140 Again, however, it needs to be read in context. Clearly,
the Court was trying to articulate a line similar to that drawn in
Chiarella, between trading that is disloyal (and hence simply should
not be allowed) and that which forms part of the acceptable operations
of the markets. The idea is that instilling investor confidence in the
integrity of the markets requires discouraging "bad" trading, and the
139. See Pritchard, Agency Law, supra note 53, at 932-34 (discussing the Court's decision in
Chiarella); Langevoort, supra note 45, at 19-20.
140. See supra Part II.B.
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theft of information is plainly bad.141 The broad duty to disclose one's
own misappropriation to the source of the information was merely a
tool needed to capture that idea. Importing that tool too easily to
other disclosure issues under Rule 10b-5 again risks taking it severely
out of context.
To underscore all of this, consider the effects of the rules in the
insider trading area. As insider trading law developed, courts first
looked to see whether there was a fiduciary-type duty that was
violated in such cases. If under the classical theory, involving a
company insider doing the trading, the duty violation is vis-A-vis the
company's shareholders. Here, the duty to disclose is the insider's
obligation either to disclose the information to the public or to abstain
from trading. Disclosure to the public in this context, though, is a
meaningless requirement since effective disclosure would mean that
there would be no value in doing the trading in question. The rule, in
effect, says that insiders with a material informational advantage over
shareholders are prohibited from trading-what we have long known
to be the practical effect of the abstain or disclose rule. 142 It operates
as an injunction against certain kinds of trading by the company
insiders. Unlike the approach of a tort-type analysis, there is no
attempt in the insider trading cases to discern whether the
counterparty to the trade was actually misled. The focus is on the
person doing the trading and the improper nature of their conduct.
Indeed, the counterparty in a market transaction likely had no idea
that she was trading against a company insider and just as easily
could have executed that same transaction with some non-insider at
the same price.
So, too, with the misappropriation theory. The obligation of the
insider is to disclose that she is planning to trade. But the rule is not
actually meant to produce disclosure to the source or protect the
source's property rights in the information. After all, no employee or
agent is really going to disclose to her boss that she is planning to
steal from her before she does the stealing. The rule, while articulated
as a disclosure obligation, again amounts to a prohibition on trading.
In other words, the right to trade on the information is allocated
141. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of
Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395, 431-35 (1998). This is not to say that the Court's approach
was analytically coherent, but simply effective in pursuing its chosen aim of promoting investor
confidence. We acknowledge that the cumulative effect of the case law may be far removed from
intellectual coherence. Saikrishna Parkash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1532-47 (1999); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory
of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1264-80 (1998).
142. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 62, at 784-85.
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exclusively to the source and the employee of the source is excluded
from using the information. That rationale, though perfectly
serviceable in its own context, simply does not work when applied to
questions such as an issuer's affirmative disclosure duty.
B. The Issuer's Duty to Disclose Rests Best on Tort-type Reasoning
As just suggested, one of the biggest mistakes courts have
made is to treat the insider trading rules and rhetoric as if they
provided a useful framework on a very different kind of question, the
issuer's duty to disclose. The issuer's duty poses a distinct and
complicated set of interests. Disclosure is costly, in a way borne
directly by investors, both in terms of the time and effort it takes to
gather and produce and in the threat of premature release of
proprietary information that operates to the disadvantage of the firm.
On the other hand, the benefits of disclosure are hard to dispute. 143
As Ed Kitch and other scholars in this area have shown, striking the
right balance is difficult.' 44
A number of implications follow. First, courts should be
reluctant to set policy in issuer disclosure cases-that is a job the
securities laws assign to the SEC, and the SEC's choices should
presumptively define the proper "property-thinking" norms. In other
words, where the SEC has addressed a subject by setting affirmative
disclosure rules, the presumption should be that the antifraud rules
require nothing else. Thus, the scope of disclosure in a public offering
should be what the instructions of the relevant form require. So, too,
in the proxy area. 145 Though surely tempting, it would be wrong to
draw from Chiarella's fiduciary principle any duty to disclose more
than the rules require.' 46 This is not to say, however, that the duty to
143. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 989-92 (1991) (discussing the imposition of disclosure requirements).
144. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
763 (1995); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1047, 1047, 1111-1112 (1995). This is a common ground for doubting that even the SEC
can do a good job, see, e.g., Stephen Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (arguing that behavioral and cognitive biases affect the SEC's ability
to effectively regulate financial markets). Regardless of whether one agrees, the idea that courts
can do a better job under the rubric of fraud is highly doubtful.
145. One of us has suggested a stronger usefulness to the fiduciary obligation in the proxy
context, see Langevoort, supra note 45, at 466. On reflection, it is probably best to leave this as
part of management's duty not to mislead. Descriptively, however, it is clear that many courts
have operated as if there were a fiduciary duty to disclose in proxy solicitations.
146. As noted earlier, one recent case, State of New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 314 F. Supp. 2d
1119, 1139 (D. Kan. 2004), came to this conclusion. The court in that case did not flag the fact
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disclose as applied by courts need necessarily be restrictive-recall
that the SEC mandates in all filings the disclosure of additional
material information necessary to make the responses to the line-item
requirements not misleading. 147 But that "half-truth" notion is the
boundary line. Cases like Shaw that look for a duty to disclose
something beyond that explicitly required should limit the inquiry to
those disclosures that satisfy our "tort-thinking" test: that is those
whose omissions would likely mislead reasonable investors, given the
informational context the SEC has created for disclosure in public
offerings.
What about the duties to update or correct? One plausible
response might be Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Gallagher v. Abbott
Labs.148 Easterbrook viewed the plaintiffs as making, effectively, a
duty-to-update claim. Turning to the Seventh Circuit's unwillingness
to recognize such a duty, he explained that the creation of a duty-to-
update was the province of the SEC and not the courts. Presumably,
the story here is that Congress delegated the authority for rulemaking
in the disclosure department to the SEC because of its special
expertise. Courts do not have this expertise and, therefore, rationally
may not want to engage in this potentially dangerous task.
We disagree, though his point about deference and institutional
competence is well taken. To us, deference is appropriate when the
underlying question is policy-based "property" thinking, driven by the
desire to achieve the right balance of fairness or efficiency. However,
when a form of issuer disclosure actually has the potential to mislead
investors, courts have long-standing institutional competence to police
the area. And to us, the duty to update - properly understood - has
this character. There are some disclosures that reasonably do lead
investors to rely on the statements beyond the date on which the
statement was made: that is, those that establish some new policy or
speak in terms of a plan or commitment in a way that invites
continued reliance. But most issuer disclosures only speak to the
moment, and these should not be subject to the duty to update. The
relatively small handful of cases where courts have imposed liability
that it was taking a different position than most of the courts before it (and above it). In terms of
avoiding reversal and nevertheless arriving at the right outcome, the court likely made the
correct choice. The court's failure to emphasize its different approach, however, might result in
the opinion being ignored.
147. See supra Part II.A.
148. 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2001).
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for failure to update seems to respect this distinction, though not with
the clarity we might like in explaining it.149
As to the duty to correct, we face a harder problem. One way of
looking at the duty to correct is that it is conceptually indistinct from
the duty to update, so that both should be applied narrowly using the
"continuing representation" idea. We suspect, however, that the
judicial impulse to force correction more aggressively than updating is
based on something akin to a tort-like duty to rescue. That is, when
an issuer has caused investors to rely to their detriment on a prior
statement that was false, though not fraudulent, when made, the
issuer has a duty to avoid any future harm to those investors who may
still be relying, without worrying significantly whether those investors
still may be relying justifiably or not. This would be based in part on
fairness, part on efficiency. That might suggest that we are in the
"property" area, but courts probably can be excused for being assertive
in this context. Deference and restraint are normally necessary
because of the difficulty of balancing the issuer's interests regarding
such issues like the costs of information production or the need for
confidentiality. Once the issuer has chosen to speak on an issue but
has done so falsely, albeit innocently, then these competing interests
largely fall away. In other words, there are very few policy-based
reasons one can think of not to compel correction. Its endorsement by
all courts that have considered the question is not surprising once we
look carefully at the duty issue.
The question of issuer disclosure when an issuer repurchases
its securities is even more complicated. On the assumption that issuer
trading in the open markets is anonymous, tort-type thinking would
not justify an affirmative disclosure obligation. It is clearly property-
type thinking that governs this question, which may suggest a hands-
off attitude. However, we believe that issuer trading is simply a
species of insider trading generally, an area where the courts have
assumed responsibility for setting the property-like rules governing
the exploitation of informational advantages. Imposing a duty to
disclose on issuers under Rule 10b-5, which most people currently
assume to be the law, has ample justification when thought of as an
insider trading problem because it responds to concerns (such as
adverse selection in markets or the perception of unfairness) that are
traditional in insider trading reasoning.
Again, however, there is no strong reason to assume that the
opposite is also true--that a fiduciary duty attaches to issuer sales of
149. Indeed, in Gallagher itself, application of this approach would have led to the conclusion
that there was no duty to update.
2004] 1679
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
securities that do not take the form of anonymous open market trades.
The point in Chiarella that purchases and sales should be treated
identically makes sense in the insider trading context given the
special objectives at work there. 150 An issuer negotiating a private
placement of securities, or conducting a registered public offering, has
no pre-existing trust relationship with potential investors that would
justify any greater disclosure burden than those (if any) imposed by
SEC rules.
C. SEC Line-items Do Create a Duty to Disclose
One of the stranger results that some courts have reached is
the one that line-item requirements do not create a 10b-5-based
disclosure obligation. 151 Indeed, almost every one of the arguments
just made about the issuer disclosure question points in the opposite
direction. We suggested that the difficult balancing associated with
the questions of what issuer disclosure to compel and what
nondisclosure to privilege is better done by the SEC than the courts.
When the SEC has chosen to compel some disclosure via Regulation S-
K or S-B or in the instructions to a required disclosure form, that work
is done and the courts should accept the Commission's determination,
not undercut it by eliminating an enforcement mechanism.
Another way of showing this is by reference to tort-type
analysis. Consider first that it is well established that an affirmative
misrepresentation in an SEC filing is actionable,' 52 reflecting the
common-sense notion that reasonable investors actually rely on such
disclosures. It follows to us that a deliberate omission has the same
potential to mislead - the reader of the disclosure sees that the issuer
is responding to the disclosure obligation and is entitled to assume
that the response is not only accurate but complete as well. In other
words, she actually can be misled by the omission.
150. As noted earlier, the point was raised in the Chiarella opinion that when an insider is
selling, the purchaser has no pre-existing fiduciary relationship with the insider, so that the duty
to disclose premised on such a relationship would not seem to follow. But Justice Powell simply
stated that it would be a "sorry distinction" to raise. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8
(citing Learned Hand's dictum in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951)). Nothing
better illustrates that issue specific nature of the Court's reasoning than this - it effectively
relaxed its insistence on pre-existing duty simply to permit the law of insider trading to make
sense.
151. See supra Part II.A.
152. Scores of cases have so held. For a seminal decision holding that Rule 10b-5 was
available regarding false filings notwithstanding the presence of an express cause of action
(albeit hard to satisfy from a plaintiffs perspective), see Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375 (1983); Ross v. A.H. Robins, Co. Inc., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980).
[Vol. 57:5:16391680
THE MUDDLED DUTY TO DISCLOSE
There are limits inherent in this approach. For example, if an
issuer's response to a line-item were something along the lines of "we
cannot provide the information requested" or a simple failure to file
completely, this would operate as a breach of the line-item
requirement but not be a fraud. The investor is on notice of the
noncompliance and would not be misled. More subtly, the same would
be true if the issuer's disclosure were obviously confusing. To
illustrate, if a disclosure identified a self-dealing transaction but
inappropriately omitted the amount of benefit,153 investors would be
hard pressed to say that they were misled, because they would be
aware that the issuer had not provided the required information.
In addition, to clear up what might be an additional source of
confusion, plaintiffs do have to demonstrate more than the fact of the
line-item omission. The omission simply satisfies the duty element.
Materiality, scienter, reliance, and causation are additional elements,
separate and distinct from the question of duty. But if plaintiffs are
prepared to make those showings, the case should go forward.
D. In Cases Involving Neither Insider Trading Nor Issuer Disclosure
Obligations, Courts Should Retain Flexibility in Finding Duties
By far, insider trading and issuer disclosure questions
dominate the law relating to the affirmative duty to disclose. Our
suggestion is that they represent two distinct fields of inquiry, with
unique interests at stake, so that precedent and dicta developed
within each should not automatically be applied to other kinds of duty
questions. That means that the smaller category of cases addressing
other kinds of dealings should be unencumbered by restraints such as
those found in Chiarella's dicta, and courts should be sensitive to the
different set of interests involved.
Two examples will make the point. Probably the next largest
set of "duty" questions arises with respect to the disclosure obligations
of broker-dealers when dealing with customers. The law has
developed to a point where only a subset of such relationships are
deemed fiduciary. If there is a fiduciary relationship, there is a
complete duty to disclose---which the Supreme Court in Zandford154
extended to include nondisclosure of simple faithlessness. Though
this principle may seem to be an extension of O'Hagan, where a
153. This sort of confusion may have occurred in the Enron case. Donald C. Langevoort,
Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform
Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1163 (2003).
154. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822-23 (2002).
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similar analysis was employed, it is really very different. Tort-type
analysis can readily explain how a trusting client could in fact be
deceived by such misconduct. Indeed, that is how the fiduciary duty to
disclose initially developed.
In the nonfiduciary broker-customer relationship, that
approach does not work. Yet we still see fairly broad duties to disclose
risk-related information, often by reference to the fiction of the shingle
theory. That is a property method at work, creating an expectation of
fair dealing rather than necessarily protecting a pre-existing one.
While that may seem inappropriate under our approach, consider the
context. Congress long ago made broker-dealers a subject of extensive
federal concern and made fraud the primary standard for policing
their conduct outside the context of self-regulation. 155 This signal gave
courts reason to extend duties flexibly, which they have done. The
same could be done in the mutual fund area, which recently has
generated its own set of "duty" issues growing out of the late trading
and market timing scandals.
By contrast, we can see why the same logic might not justify
comparable expansiveness in settings such as corporate
mismanagement-though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests that in the
last few years, the line of federal interest on matters of corporate
governance may have shifted. Consider the Ken Lay example
discussed earlier. 156 One could take the Chiarella-O'Hagan fiduciary
principle as giving rise to a broad duty to disclose all material facts,
including one's own faithlessness. If that is tied to a securities
purchase or sale, which could readily be found in the stock options
granted by the presumably unsuspecting compensation committee of
the board, nondisclosure of virtually anything smacking of corporate
mismanagement could be a violation of Rule 10b-5. Thus far, courts
have been reluctant to federalize corporate mismanagement, which
would be an example of flexible duty analysis at the more restrictive
end of the spectrum. To the extent that the federalism balance has
shifted more recently, courts might be justified in expanding the
notion of duty in the context to conform to the perceived increase in
federal interest. For now, our point is that a flexible duty analysis
captures what courts should do in this sphere fairly well.
That, in turn, suggests that the so-called death of "flexible
duty" as a distinct form of reasoning (putting aside the state of mind
element) may have been an overreaction to Chiarella and the
155. Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV.
1247, 1279-83 (1983).
156. See supra Part I.B.
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demotion of a construct that has a good deal of appeal. The small
number of cases that have accepted the possibility of such analysis in
the years after Chiarella-particularly the Eighth Circuit's Reves
decision 157-- deserve more attention and respect than they have been
given.
E. Concern About Litigation Abuse Should Not Play Any Role in Duty
Questions
We suspect that courts that cut back on the duty involved in
questions such as issuer liability in the aftermath of Chiarella may
have felt comfortable in so doing not simply because the conclusion
logically follows from the insider trading context (which it, in
actuality, does not) but because narrowing duty seemed responsive to
the growing feeling in the federal courts during the 1980s and 90s that
nonmeritorious litigation was a growing problem. 15 Broad, flexible
duties seemed tailor-made for aggressive private litigants. The
cutback most likely driven by this anti-plaintiff bias was the holding
that SEC line-item requirements such as the MD&A do not create a
duty for fraud purposes. This, as we have shown, sets logic and any
reasonable notion of institutional primacy on its head.
The broader point we make here is one of judicial process. One
can debate whether the judicial attitude toward excessive private
litigation was justified during this time. Plainly, the courts were
sensitive to the issue. But in 1995, Congress provided a
comprehensive set of answers to the problem, particularly in the form
of heightened pleading requirements and the safe harbor for forward-
looking information. These steps may have been an overreaction,
setting the bar too high, but that is not our point. Rather, the point is
that now that Congress has addressed the question, for better or
worse, courts should not draw blindly from pre-1995 case law that
expressed discomfort with private litigation before the reforms
Congress initiated. This may well be a serious problem because there
was so much judicial innovation during that time period that can be
traced to the discomfort. The point is that now, a case cannot go
forward without a strong pre-discovery showing by the plaintiffs
indicating that it is not a strike suit. Courts may not be perfect
157. See supra Part II.E.
158. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials
(2004) (draft on file with authors) (describing the literature on meritorious versus non
meritorious filings in the securities fraud area). For a fuller description of the underlying
cognitive dynamics here, see Donald C. Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create "Good"
Securities Fraud Doctrines?, 51 EMORY L. J. 309, 313-15 (2002).
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arbiters here, but the bias surely favors defendants more than
plaintiffs. Moreover, forward-looking disclosures get a deep safe
harbor even when fraud seems likely.
Given those two "reforms," one might think about whether a
court should hold that the kinds of forward-looking disclosures
mandated by the MD&A give rise to a 10b-5 duty. Even if, prior to
1995, a judge might have thought that denying the duty would be a
protective device, 159 there is no reason to continue that logic in the
aftermath of reform. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, we
suspect that there are many doctrinal moves still applied today, even
though the justification for the conservatism has been superseded now
by what Congress did. In other words, there are legacies in the case
law that operate perniciously today. We would venture the guess that
many duty cases from this time period fall into that category.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our conclusion can be summarized by saying that the duty to
disclose under Rule 10b-5 is not a problem with a single coherent
answer but a set of problems that deserve different kinds of context-
specific analysis. If this is correct, the law took a wrong turn when
one subject area-insider trading-came to dominate thinking so
much so that it appeared to be paradigmatic rather than unique. In
many ways, our normative recommendations are simply a suggestion
that courts return to commonsensical, case specific determinations-
and cease using misfit rules and formulas.
In contrast to the law of insider trading, most duty questions
are not designed to bar any activity but rather to encourage an
appropriate level of candor in the capital markets. The largest
categories of Section 10(b) claims involve attacks on statements.
Here, courts ask the question of whether the statements were likely to
mislead the reasonable investor. Starting from the basic premise that
their job is to regulate speech, while keeping in mind that companies
need to be able to speak to the public, they have created subcategories
of speech that are intended to be less regulated, such as speech that
looks to be puffery or speech that is accompanied by sufficient
cautionary language. At the margins of the explicit speech cases are
the partial speech cases. Here, what is alleged to be misleading is
some combination of speech and context. Although not as comfortable
159. The belief that denying the duty was a protective device might explain the strange turn
the law took.
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with these cases as with the pure speech cases, we see that the courts
attempt to locate these within the speech box and then apply a tort-
type analysis to them.
Many of the struggles that the courts have had with the duties
to update and correct and the half-truth rule are a function of (a) their
uncertainty as to what analysis to apply to these partial speech cases,
and (b) their attempt to squeeze these into the speech category and,
therefore, a tort analysis. Once it is clear that a tort analysis should
be applied in such speech plus circumstance cases, the courts then
have to look to the combination of speech and circumstance and ask
whether investors were misled. The analysis is much the same as
though an affirmative statement were being attacked as misleading.
The difference is that in these cases it is often some inaction
that is being attacked as misleading. For example, with the duties to
correct and update, courts ask whether some prior statement is still
"alive" and whether the failure to correct or update was misleading.
And although courts have done little to explain how one might
determine whether a prior statement is still alive, such an analysis
would presumably look at factors such as the context in which the
statement was made, the importance that the speaker gave to it, and
the type of company at issue. This is tort-like thinking in that it
indicates to companies primarily that while they may talk and act,
they must be careful not to mislead.
Moreover, this liability is not necessarily a function of whether
parties are in any sort of special relationship with those who were
misled. The market is the analog to society in a formal tort action.
Just as one has obligations to make sure that the path to one's home is
cleared of ice and not so slippery that unwary trespassers or guests
would fall, companies need to be careful in making statements, even if
they are not aimed at investors, so that unwary market participants
are not misled. For example, a company may be in the process of
touting its new product to a group of customers, but that is not an
excuse if investors happen to hear those statements and are misled.
Such investors can sue as long as it would have been reasonable for
them to have been misled. It is not a defense for the company to say
that it did not aim its statements at the stock market but the product
market.
The analytical tool that might well have been applied to all of
the foregoing contexts is the "flexible duty," the label invoked in so
many of the early duty to disclose cases. The duty is a function of
factors such as the inequality in access to information between the
parties and their initial expectations. The thrust of the duty is in
telling the sophisticated sellers of securities that they have to be
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careful when they transact with those less able to evaluate the
transactions at issue. In other words, the flexible duty is a tool that
one uses to apply a tort-type analysis to the question of whether
nondisclosure under certain conditions can be misleading. That courts
over the past two decades have demonstrated a reluctance to use this
tool, even though it has been available to them and could have solved
some of their more difficult analytical problems, is an unfortunate
oversight.
